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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we investigate the decision criteria for two classical problems in
operations management, inventory control and project management, by tak-
ing into account the effect of aspiration level such as profit target. Different to
the existing approach that maximizes the probability of the profit reaching
targets, we optimize a new target-oriented decision criterion. In invento-
ry management, we study both single-period and multiple-period problems.
For the single-period (newsvendor) problem, the results from our theoretical
model happen to be consistent with existing findings in newsvendor experi-
ments. For the multi-period problem, we incorporate the financing decisions,
lending/borrowing activities, to smooth out consumptions over time. We
show that if borrowing and lending are unrestricted, the optimal financing
policy derived from the target-based criterion is to finance consumptions at
the target levels for all periods except the last. Moreover, the optimal in-
ventory policy preserves the structure of base-stock policy or (s,S) policy,
and could be achieved with relatively modest computational effort. Under
restricted financing, we show that the optimal policies are indeed as the same
as those that maximize expected additive-exponential utilities, and can be
obtained by an efficient algorithm. In project management, we consider a
project selection problem where each project has uncertain return with par-
Abstract x
tially characterized probability distribution. The model captures correlation
and interaction effects such as synergies. We solve the model using binary
search, and obtain solutions of the subproblems from Benders decomposition
techniques. As a simple alternative, we describe a greedy heuristic, which
routinely provides project portfolios with near optimal underperformance
risk.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In operations management models involving uncertainties, we typically as-
sumes that the decision maker is risk neutral and maximizes the expected
profit, or equivalently, minimizes the expected cost. Although simple and el-
egant, this assumption neglects the risk embedded in these problems, where
the risk is not always ignorable, especially when the scenarios would not be
repeated for a large number of times. Take start-up companies for example,
a decision subject to tremendous loss in the case of unfavorable uncertainty
realization can be devastating and lead to bankruptcy.
To take into account the decision maker’s risk attitude, researchers have
explored alternative normative models such as maximizing expected utility
or minimizing a risk measure. With different shapes of utility functions,
or different forms of risk measure, the risk attitudes of decision makers are
captured in a more general way compared with the risk neutral model. These
researches, however, still ignore one important factor in decision making
process, which is the target. In this thesis, we investigate how to make
optimal decisions in the presence of a target profit in classical operations
management problems. In particular, we start from the newsvendor problem,
which serves as a building block for inventory theory. After that, we analyze
the general dynamic programming problem, and apply our framework on
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the multiple period inventory-pricing problem. Besides, we also study the
target-based framework under the zero-one optimization setting, investigate
the project selection problem.
Structure of the chapter. In Section 1.1, we discuss the motivations
for incorporating targets in operations management problems and provide
related literatures. Section 1.2 presents the outline of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation and Literatures Review
It is a common phenomenon in industry that, in making decisions, managers
are often concerned about a profit target to reach. The concern of profit
target is driven by several reasons.
First, as Conger et al. (1998) and Bossidy (2007) point out, one of the
key aspects in performance appraisal, which affects managers’ promotion,
bonus, and many other interests, is related to the achievement of certain
targets. Further, Hirsch (1994, p.609) suggests that firms need to assess
“how managers are achieving the goals and objectives of the company rather
than how they might be optimizing some local measures.”
Second, at the firm level, the external evaluation of the firm’s perfor-
mance is also largely dependent upon the achievement of targets. Take a
company’s stock price for example, it is widely believed that it depends on
the company’s ability to meet its financial goals (Rappaport 1999). A classi-
cal case involves Ebay in the fourth quarter of 2004. Ebay reported earnings
of 23 cents per share, which missed the target of 24 cents per share. After
the report was issued, Ebay’s stock tumbled more than 11% within a few
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hours (CNNMoney 2005). What happens to Swiss Life Holding, the largest
life insurer in Switzerland, is another example. In 2008, it failed to achieve
the profit target of $1.6 billion. As a result, its share price was decreased by
20% in Zurich trading (Giles 2008).
Last, setting targets is considered to be helpful in improving employees’
performance. Compared to “do their best,” people in general would work
more affirmatively and exert more endeavor to attain a reasonable target
(Locke and Latham 2002, Rasch and Tosi 1992, Barrick et al. 1993). In fact,
it is such a strong relationship that Locke and Latham (2002) consider goal
setting as possibly the best managerial tool in terms of effectiveness.
The prevalence of setting and meeting targets in decision making is
well observed. Through interviews with twenty companies, Lanzillotti (1958)
show that most of these firms set their goals to achieve a target profit. In
another interview conducted by Mao (1970), he establishes that managers
view risk as the probability of meeting a target profit. Brown and Tang
(2006) also demonstrate that when placing orders, inventory managers are
concerned about the ability to attain a target profit. Laboratory experiments,
albeit not in the newsvendor problem setting, have also been run to illustrate
the impact of target on decision making (Payne et al. 1980, 1981). Further,
the importance of incorporating a target into decision making is highlighted
in Simon (1955), Rubinstein (1998), and Gigerenzer and Selten (2002).
Motivated by the evidence above, we aim to investigate the decision
making in operations management problem under the consideration of a tar-
get profit.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2: The Impact of a Target on Newsvendor Decisions.
We investigate the impact of a target on newsvendor decisions. Dif-
ferent from the existing approach that maximizes the probability of
the profit reaching the target, in this chapter we model the effect of a
target by maximizing the satisficing measure of a newsvendor’s profit
with respect to that target. We study two satisficing measures: i) CVaR
satisficing measure that evaluates the highest confidence level of CVaR
achieving the target; and ii) Entropic satisficing measure that assesses
the smallest risk tolerance level under which the certainty equivalent
for exponential utility function achieves the target. For both satisficing
measures, we find that the optimal ordering quantity increases with the
target level. Further, the newsvendor orders more than the risk-neutral
solution (over-order) sometimes and less than that (under-order) oth-
er times, depending on the target level. The more interesting finding
is that if the target is proportional to the unit marginal profit and
is also determined by only one other demand-related factor, then the
newsvendor over-orders low-profit product and under-orders high-profit
product.
• Chapter 3: Managing Operational and Financing Decisions to
Meet Consumption Targets. We study dynamic operational deci-
sion problems where risky cash flows are being resolved over a finite
planning horizon. Financing decisions via lending and borrowing are
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available to smooth out consumptions over time with the goal of achiev-
ing some prescribed consumption targets. Our target-oriented decision
criterion is based on the aggregation of Aumann and Serrano (2008)
riskiness indices of the consumption excesses over targets, which has
salient properties of subadditivity, convexity and respecting second-
order stochastic dominance. We show that if borrowing and lending
are unrestricted, the optimal policy based on this criterion is to fi-
nance consumptions at the target levels for all periods except the last.
Moreover, the optimal policy has the same control structure as the
optimal risk neutral policy and could be achieved with relatively mod-
est computational effort. Under restricted financing, we show that for
convex dynamic decision problems, the optimal policies are indeed as
the same as those that maximize expected additive-exponential utili-
ties, and can be obtained by an efficient algorithm. We also analyze
the optimal policies of joint inventory-pricing decision problems un-
der the target-oriented criterion and provide optimal policy structures.
With a numerical study for inventory control problems, we report fa-
vorable computational results for using targets in regulating uncertain
consumptions over time.
• Chapter 4: Managing Underperformance Risk in Project Port-
folio Selection. We consider a project selection problem where each
project has an uncertain return with partially characterized proba-
bility distribution. The decision maker selects a feasible subset of
projects so that the risk of the portfolio return not meeting a spec-
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ified target is minimized. Our work extends the riskiness index of
Aumann and Serrano (2008) by incorporating the target and also dis-
tributional ambiguity. We minimize the underperformance risk of the
project portfolio, which we define as the reciprocal of the absolute risk
aversion (ARA) of an ambiguity averse individual with constant ARA
who is indifferent between the target return with certainty and the un-
certain portfolio return. Our model captures correlation and interac-
tion effects such as synergies. We solve the model using binary search,
and obtain solutions of the subproblems from Benders decomposition
techniques. A computational study shows that project portfolios gener-
ated by minimizing the underperformance risk have certain advantages
in achieving the target compared with those found by benchmark ap-
proaches, including maximization of expected return, minimization of
underperformance probability, mean-variance analysis, and maximiza-
tion of Roy’s (1952) safety first ratio. As a simpler alternative, we
describe a greedy heuristic, which routinely provides project portfolios
with near optimal underperformance risk.
• Chapter 5: Conclusions. This chapter provides the conclusion of the
thesis, which summarizes key findings and highlights future research.
1.3 Notation
Throughout this thesis, we denote a random variable by a character with the
tilde sign such as z˜, and z is its realization. A random variable is defined on
a probability space (Ω,F ,P) where Ω is the set of possible outcomes, F is a
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σ-algebra that describes the set of all possible events, and P is the probability
measure function.
2. THE IMPACT OF A TARGET ON NEWSVENDOR
DECISIONS
To capture the impact of a target on newsvendor decision making as well as
address the drawback of attainment probability measure or expected utility,
our model adopts the recently developed satisficing measure (Brown and Sim
2009, Brown et al. 2012), a class of risk measures that evaluate the ability of
a certain metric – which is associated with the underlying random payoff –
achieving a target. The attainment probability measure used in Lau (1980)
is in fact a special case of a satisficing measure with the metric being the
quantile. However, our study focuses on satisficing measures with other
metrics such as those taking into account the magnitude of unfavorable profit
realization. We focus on two commonly used metrics with respect to the
random profit: CVaR (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000, 2002) and Certainty
Equivalent for exponential utility function (Mas-Collel et al. 1995). CVaR
measures the expected value of the profit that is falling below a certain
quantile value (we call it worst-case-scenario expected profit, where “worst” is
associated with confidence level). To incorporate the fact that people are not
always risk averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), we extend the definition of
CVaR such that it also measures the expected value of the profit that is above
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a certain quantile value (we call it best-case-scenario expected profit, where
“best” is also associated with confidence level). The Certainty Equivalent
for a risky alternative is the certain amount that is equally preferred to the
alternative. Similarly, we study the certainty equivalent for both the risk-
averse and risk-seeking scenarios. Corresponding to these two metrics, we
consider CVaR Satisficing Measure (CSM) and Entropic Satisficing Measure
(ESM), respectively. The former evaluates the confidence level of CVaR
achieving the target and the latter assesses the risk tolerance level under
which the certainty equivalent achieves the target. Note that it is desirable
to have a CSM value as big as possible. This suggests that one can be
highly confident about the expected profit achieving the target even if the
random profit is realized in an undesirable region. Similarly, higher ESM
value is preferred because it implies that a highly conservative decision maker
can still have the certainty equivalent exceeding the target and accept the
underlying decision. As such, the objective of the newsvendor is to find an
order quantity that maximizes the CVaR (and Entropic) satisficing measure.
It is worth noting that CSM and ESM represent two different ways
decision makers perceive risks. Since CVaR measures the expectation con-
ditioning on falling below (or above, in our extended definition) a certain
quantile, CSM reflects the emphasis on downside (or upside) risk. The ESM,
however, is based on the certainty equivalent for exponential utility function
and takes into account all realizations of underlying randomness. As such,
ESM captures the attention on full scale risk. Interestingly, regardless which
of the two measures is adopted, our findings on the effect of target remain
the same, which suggests that our target-based newsvendor model is robust
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to how decision makers recognize risks.
Before presenting the models and analyses, we summarize our contribu-
tions to literature.
• We build an easy-to-apply normative model to capture the effect of
target on newsvendor decision. With the decision criteria of both CSM
and ESM, we are able to provide a more comprehensive analysis than
existing literature on the impact of target. Our results complement
that of the existing literature that only maximizes the probability of
profit reaching the target.
• We characterize the optimal ordering strategy for target-based newsven-
dors and show that (i) optimal order quantity increases with target
level; (ii) the same decision maker can sometimes order more than and
other times less than the risk neutral ordering quantity (i.e., the one
maximizing expected profit), depending on the target level; and (iii) if
the target is proportional to the unit marginal profit, the newsvendor
will under-order high-profit products, and over-order low-profit prod-
ucts.
• We take one step further and show that if the target is set properly,
our model gives exactly the same solution as the expected utility model
does.
Structure of the chapter. Section 2.1 describes the CVaR satisficing
measure, illustrates how to find the optimal order quantity under CVaR sat-
isficing measure, and also shows how the optimal order quantity is affected by
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the target. Section 2.2 investigates the newsvendor problem under Entropic
satisficing measure. Section 2.3 presents computational studies to compare
the performance of our target-based newsvendor decisions to that of other
newsvendor model decisions. We conclude this chapter in Section 2.4. Final-
ly, in Section 2.5, we provide several lemmas which are needed for the proof
of some theorems in this chapter.
2.1 Newsvendor Decision with CVaR Satisficing Measure
A newsvendor decides how many units of product to order before the selling
season. Each unit can be purchased at cost c and sold at price p. The
random demand d˜ is assumed to be bounded by [d, d¯] ⊆ ℜ+ and without
loss of generality, continuously distributed. Note that all the results in this
chapter can be easily extended to general demand distribution, which can be
unbounded and not necessary continuous.
For simplicity, the unsatisfied demand is lost and the salvage value for
unsold items is assumed to be zero. With an order quantity y, the newsven-
dor’s profit is given by:
v˜(y) = −cy + pmin(y, d˜). (2.1)
2.1.1 CVaR Satisficing Measure
Let B be the set of bounded random variables. Following the path of the
recently developed CVaR satisficing measure (Brown et al. 2012), which is to
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quantify a random profit’s risk with respect to a specified target, we define
CVaR Satisficing Measure as follows:
Definition 1. Given a target profit τ ∈ ℜ, the CVaR satisficing measure




sup {η ∈ (−1, 1) : CV aRη(v˜) ≥ τ} , if feasible,
−1 otherwise,
(2.2)








1−ηE[min{v˜ − a, 0}]
}
if η ∈ [0, 1),
−CV aR−η(−v˜) if η ∈ (−1, 0).
(2.3)
It is worth mentioning that if v˜ is continuously distributed, an equivalent




E [ v˜| v˜ ≤ q1−η(v˜)] , if η ∈ [0, 1),
E [ v˜| v˜ ≥ q−η(v˜)] , if η ∈ (−1, 0),
(2.4)
where qη(v˜) is the unique η-quantile of v˜. According to the definition in (2.4),
for η ∈ [0, 1), CV aRη(v˜) measures the expectation of v˜ in the worst (1− η)
case realizations; for η ∈ (−1, 0), it measures the expectation in the best
(1 + η) case realizations.
The traditional CV aRη is defined only on η ∈ [0, 1) and measures the
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worst case expectation, which implies risk averse preference. To capture the
risk seeking behavior, we enable CV aRη to assess the best case performance
by extending the range of η to include (−1, 0). As such, with η < 0, CV aRη
results in risk seeking choice due to its nature of seeking for best case per-
formance. While CV aRη is a convex risk measure and favors diversification
for η > 0 (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000, 2002), we can verify that it is a
concave risk measure and favors concentration for η < 0.
By Definition 1, CSM measures the highest η that guarantees CV aRη
achieving a target. Observe that CV aRη is essentially a conditional expec-
tation of the random payoff. The index η prescribes the condition for this
conditional expectation: a positive η implies that the expectation is taken
over the worst (1 − η) case, whereas a negative η suggests an expectation
w.r.t. to the realization of the best (1 + η) case. As such, it is desirable for
a random payoff to have a high CSM value, as this implies that the random
payoff v˜ is more secure w.r.t. τ . Intuitively, we can think of ρτ as a security
index for random payoff to achieve target.
To further illustrate the concept of CSM, assume that for a continuous
random variable v˜, we have ρτ (v˜) = k, where k ∈ (0, 1). By definition of
ρτ we know that E[v˜|v˜ ≤ qλ(v˜)] < τ if and only if λ < 1 − k. In other
words, conditioning on that the randomness does not always realize in the
worst (1 − k) case, the expectation of v˜ will exceed the target. Similarly, if
ρτ (v˜) = −k < 0, then E[v˜|v˜ ≥ qλ] ≥ τ if and only if λ ≥ k. That is, E[v˜]
will be no less than τ conditioning on that realization of the randomness will
surely fall in the best (1− k) case.
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2.1.2 Newsvendor with CSM





where v˜(y) is given by (2.1). For this problem, an order quantity needs to
be decided to maximize CSM, which means that this optimal order quantity
should be the one that makes it most secure for the profit to achieve the
target.
If problem (2.5) has an optimal objective value in (−1, 1), it can be
reformulated as:
max η
s.t. CV aRη (v˜(y)) ≥ τ,
η ∈ (−1, 1),
y ≥ 0.
(2.6)
By the definition in (2.3), we can verify that CV aRη(·) is non-increasing
in η. Therefore, we can find the optimal solution for the problem in (2.6) by





Note that the optimal value of the problem in (2.5) is 1 if and only if for all
η ∈ (−1, 1), we have the optimal value of the problem in (2.7) no less than
τ ; and it is −1 if and only if we have the optimal value of the problem in
(2.7) strictly less than τ for all η ∈ (−1, 1). As such, we can efficiently solve
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the problem in (2.5) with a binary search on η as long as we are able to solve
the problem in (2.7) easily, which indeed is the case as suggested by Lemma
1 below that provides the solution to (2.7).
Lemma 1. For any η ∈ (−1, 1), we have
argmax
y≥0
CV aRη (v˜(y)) =


F−1 (ξ − ηξ) if η ∈ [0, 1),
F−1 (ξ − η(1− ξ)) if η ∈ (−1, 0),
where ξ = p−c
p
is called critical fractile, and F is the cumulative distribution
of d˜.
Proof. For the case of η ∈ [0, 1), the result can be referred to Gotoh and Takano
(2007). Here we just discuss on the case of η ∈ (−1, 0), where






















Here the g(y, a) is defined as












(pz − cy − a)+ dF (z) + (py − cy − a)+ (1− F (y))
)
.
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For any given y ≥ 0, we discuss on the three different cases.
1. a ≤ −cy. In this case, g(y, a) = a + 1
1+η





2. −cy ≤ a ≤ py − cy. In this case, we have




















3. a ≥ py − cy. In this case, g(y, a) = a, ∂g
∂a
= 1 > 0.
Therefore, let a∗(y) = argmina∈ℜ g(y, a), we should have −cy ≤ a∗(y) ≤
py − cy. Hence, it suffices to consider a ∈ [−cy, py − cy] in the following
discussion, and it implies (cy + a)/p ∈ [0, y].




≤ 0, py − cy = a∗(y), CV aRη(v˜(y)) =
py − cy, and
∂CV aRη(v˜(y))
∂y
= p− c > 0.
If y ≥ F−1(−η), by FOD, a∗(y) = pF−1(−η)− cy,






















F−1 (ξ − η(1− ξ)).
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Remark: As we assume the demand is continuously distributed, F−1 is
a mapping to a scalar. Hence, by Lemma 1 we can see that the problem
(2.7) has unique optimal solution when η ∈ (−1, 1). Suppose we relax the
assumption on the random demand such that it can follow non-continuous
distribution, then F−1 may possibly map to a set instead of a scalar, in
which case the solution for the problem (2.7) is no longer unique and that
complicates the following analysis. While we have proved all the following
results still hold for non-continuous distribution, here we assume the demand
is continuously distributed to simplify the analysis.
We now proceed to examine how the target profit affects the ordering
decision.




∃y1 ≥ y2 ≥ 0 such that yi ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτi (v˜(y)), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. For i ∈ {1, 2}, denote ρi = ρ∗τi = maxy≥0 ρτi (v˜(y)). By the definition
of CSM we can get ρ1 ≤ ρ2 since τ1 ≥ τ2.





) = 1. Hence, there must exist y ∈ [d, d¯] maximizing CSM. Here we just
look at the existence of yi ∈ [d, d¯] to prove the result.
First, we consider the case that −1 < ρ1 ≤ ρ2 < 1. Let
yi = argmaxCV aRρi (v˜(y)) =


F−1 (ξ − ρiξ) if ρi ∈ [0, 1),
F−1 (ξ − ρi(1− ξ)) if ρi ∈ (−1, 0).
(2.8)
By definition, we can easily check that ρτi (v˜(yi)) = ρi, yi ∈ argmaxy≥0 ρτi (v˜(y)).
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By (2.8), we have y1 ≥ y2 since ρ1 ≤ ρ2.
Secondly, consider the case that ρ1 = −1. We have ρτ1 (v˜(y)) = −1 for
all y. Choose y1 = d¯. For any y2 ∈ [d, d¯] such that ρτ2 (v˜(y2)) = ρ2, we have
y1 ≥ y2.
Finally, consider the case that −1 < ρ1 ≤ ρ2 = 1. Let y∗ ∈ [d, d¯] be an
order quantity such that ρτ2 (v˜ (y
∗)) = 1. By Lemma 2, P (v˜ (y∗) ≥ τ2) = 1,
which implies −cy∗+pd ≥ τ2. Hence, we have −cd+pd ≥ τ2, and ρτ2 (v˜ (d)) =




ρτi (v˜(y)) , i ∈ {1, 2} may not necessary has unique optimal
solution. Therefore, in the above theorem, we use yi ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτi (v˜(y))
rather than yi = argmax
y≥0
ρτi (v˜(y)) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The first part of Theorem 1 shows that the newsvendor’s maximal CSM
decreases with the target profit. This is because the same random profit
must be more secure if we have a lower target, and be riskier if we have a
higher target. Consequently, the best quantity decision made under a low
target must make the profit at least as secure as that under a high target.
The second part of Theorem 1 suggests that the newsvendor will order
more if the target is higher. To understand this result, we note that a high
target is an indication of the newsvendor’s soaring ambition, which is more
likely to be realized if the newsvendor places a larger order. Let us consider
the extreme cases. Assume that the target is τ = (p− c)d. Then this target
can be achieved for sure if the newsvendor orders d. Hence, d is the most
secure order quantity. On the other hand, if the target τ is very high such
that the random profit from ordering small quantities is always strictly less
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than it, then the newsvendor can do nothing but place a large order.
Let yN = F
−1(ξ) be the risk neutral newsvendor solution, which maxi-
mizes the expected profit. We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If τ = E [v˜ (yN)], then yN ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)).
Proof. By the definition in (2.4), CV aR0 (v˜ (yN)) = E [v˜ (yN)] = τ . There-
fore, ρτ (v˜ (yN)) ≥ 0.
Since d˜ is continuously distributed, E[v˜(y)] is uniquely maximized at yN .
Therefore, for any y ≥ 0 and y 6= yN , we have CV aR0 (v˜ (y)) = E [v˜ (y)] <
E [v˜ (yN)] = τ. That implies ρτ (v˜(y)) ≤ 0 ≤ ρτ (v˜ (yN)).
Theorem 2 says that if the newsvendor’s target is the maximal expected
profit, then the risk-neutral newsvendor solution gives the highest CSM. This
is intuitive because for any other order quantity, the risk neutral expecta-
tion of profit is less than the target, τ = E[v(y˜N)]. As such, to enable its
CVaR to reach the target, it’s only possible by looking at the best-case profit
realization when η < 0, whereas the risk-neutral solution can do so for η = 0.
Corollary 1. 1. If τ ≤ E [v˜ (yN)], then ∃y∗ ≤ yN such that y∗ ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)).
2. If τ ≥ E [v˜ (yN)], then ∃y∗ ≥ yN such that y∗ ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)).
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2.
In the newsvendor problem, an important benchmark is the risk neutral
solution, yN . A newsvendor is said to under-order if she orders less than
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yN , and over-order if orders more than yN . Corollary 1 shows that the
newsvendor under-orders when the target is lower than the maximal expected
profit, and over-orders when the target is higher than that. Fundamentally,
in our model the target can influence the decision maker’s risk attitude. For
example, if the target is very high, then the decision maker may just take
the chance and “pray for odds.” However, if the target is low, then it makes
more sense to be more conservative.
So far we have taken the target profit as exogenously given, without
considering how it is set and what form it takes. In fact, in comparison
to the substantial body of empirical research on the effect of target (e.g.
Brown and Tang 2006), the research on how people form their targets is
rather limited. In the best of our knowledge, the only descriptive research
is a field study by Merchant and Manzoni (1989), who show that in practice
the targets are usually set in a way such that they can be achieved in eighty
to ninety percent of the time. The other stream of research, which can be
considered as a guide on how to set targets normatively, mainly focus on how
the challenging level of the goal impacts employee performance (e.g. Tubbs
1986, Locke and Latham 2002, Fried and Slowik 2004). In what follows, we
first follow the path of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and make the assumption
that the newsvendors’ target profit is determined by their expectations under
simple heuristics, and study the property of optimal order quantities.
Theorem 3. Assume τ = (p−c)×α(d˜), where α : B → ℜ+ is a function of the
random demand. Then there exists a threshold value ζ such that if p−c
p
≥ ζ ,
we can find y∗ ≤ yN such that y∗ ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)); and if
p−c
p
≤ ζ , we can
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find y∗ ≥ yN such that y∗ ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)).
Proof. Let r(ξ) = E[v˜(yN)] − τ = E[v˜(F−1(ξ))] − (p − c)α(d˜). According
to Corollary 1, r(ξ) ≤ 0 implies over-ordering, and r(ξ) ≥ 0 implies under-
ordering. If α(d˜) ≤ d, we get for all ξ,
r(ξ) = E[v˜(yN)]− (p− c)× α(d˜) ≥ E[v˜(d)]− (p− c)d = 0.
So we just need to choose ζ = 0.
Similarly, if α(d˜) ≥ d¯, we get r(ξ) ≤ 0 for all ξ. So we just choose ζ = 1.



























Therefore r(0) = 0, r′(0) < 0, and r(ξ) is convex since r′(ξ) is increasing.
If α(d˜) < E[d˜], we have r(1) > 0, and ∃ζ ∈ (0, 1) such that r(ξ) ≤ 0 for
ξ ≤ ζ , and r(ξ) ≥ 0 for ξ ≥ ζ .
If α(d˜) ≥ E[d˜], r(1) ≤ 0, and r(ξ) ≤ 0 for all possible ξ ∈ [0, 1], so we
can choose ζ = 1.
According to Theorem 3, if the newsvendor develops her targets follow-
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ing the simple heuristic of τ = (p − c)α(d˜), i.e., the target is proportional
to the unit marginal profit as well as a demand-related factor, she will then
under-order high-profit products and over-order low-profit products. Here
τ = (p− c)× α(d˜) can be considered as a simple and intuitive heuristic for
the newsvendors to set their targets. For example, a newsvendor can simply
treat the random demand as a deterministic one with the value equal to its
expectation. After taking 20% off as the cost of uncertainty, her target profit
is set to be τ = 80% × (p − c)E[d˜]. Hence, for this newsvendor we have
α(d˜) = 0.8E[d˜]. Likewise, the target can be τ = 0.6(p − c) × m(d˜), where
m(d˜) is the mode of the demand distribution.
It is worth noting that high-profit and low-profit are benchmarked a-
gainst the threshold value ζ . At the individual level, different newsvendors
may have different heuristics α(d˜), and hence different threshold value ζ .
From the proof for Theorem 3, we know that a high value of α(d˜) leads to a
larger ζ , meaning that the newsvendor would consider a wide range of prod-
ucts as low-value. This is probably because the newsvendor with higher α(d˜)
has higher target profit and is more ambitious. As a result, she is more likely
to consider a product as low-profit and over-order it.
We use Corollary 2 to further illustrate Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. Assume the random demand d˜ is uniformly distributed in [d, d¯] ⊂
ℜ+, and τ = (p− c)× α(d˜), where α : B → ℜ+ is a function of the random
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such that if p−c
p





≤ ζU , we can find y∗ ≥ yN such that y∗ ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)).
Proof. Following the assumption of uniform demand and the proof of The-


























By (2.10) we can see that the threshold value ζU increases with α(d). To
have a more concrete example, let d = 100, d¯ = 200, α(d˜) = kE[d˜] = 150k
with k a constant that falls in the range of (0,1). Hence, the decision maker
forms the target profit as τ = 150k(p − c). A start-up company may set a
conservative target such that k has a low value of 80%, i.e., τ = 80%(p −
c)E[d˜]. From (2.10) we know that the threshold value is ζU = 0.4. That is, the
company would consider a product to be a high-profit one and under-order it
2. The Impact of a Target on Newsvendor Decisions 24
if and only if the product has p−c
p
> 0.4. In contrast, if the company is well-
established and has higher tolerance for risk, it may set a more ambitious
target such that k = 90%, i.e., τ = 90%(p− c)E[d˜]. Similarly we can get the
threshold value ζU = 0.7, which means a product is considered high-profit
if and only if p−c
p
> 0.7. Figure 2.1 provides a clear illustration on how the
under-order and over-order regions change with the threshold values.
over-order under-order
over-order under-order
0 0.4                      0.7                       1
 ! "
 
# $ %&'  ! " ()*+,
# $ -&'  ! " ()*+,
Fig. 2.1: High and low profit products for the two newsvendors.
Another stream of normative target setting is to study how should a firm
set a target such that the decision made by the manager, who is driven by the
target, will be the one optimizes the whole firm’s objective. In accordance
with this concept and assuming that the firm’s objective being CV aRη, η ∈
[−1, 1], we have the following result.
Proposition 1. With the target value τ = max
y≥0
CV aRη(v˜(y)), we have
argmax
y≥0
ρτ (v˜(y)) = argmax
y≥0
CV aRη(v˜(y)).
Proof. It is obvious from the binary search procedure in finding the solution
of the left hand side.
According to Proposition 1, if the manager makes decision based on the
target and using CSM criterion, the firm just needs to set the target level
at the optimal CV aRη value. In that case, the manager’s decision would be
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exactly as the same as the solution maximizing the CV aRη criterion.
2.2 Newsvendor with ESM
The second satisficing measure we consider for newsvendor decision is Entrop-
ic satisficing measure (ESM), which is focused on certainty equivalent achiev-
ing the target. Different from CSM, which considers only the worst/best case
expectation, ESM captures all possible realizations of the random profit and
hence represents decision makers’ preference over the full scale. By assuming
exponential utility function, we define the ESM as follows:
Definition 2. Given a target profit τ , the entropic satisficing measure (ESM),




sup {η : Cη(v˜) ≥ τ} , if feasible,
−∞ otherwise,
(2.11)






lnE [exp(−ηv˜)] if η 6= 0,
E[v˜] if η = 0.
(2.12)
From Definition 2 we can see that, a random profit with higher ρEτ
attracts a greater subset of individuals who are willing to prefer the ran-
dom profit over the target profit with certainty. In other words, an optimal
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newsvendor decision under the ESM framework is one such that this decision
is favorable even to decision makers with very low risk tolerance level. This
decision criterion can be especially useful for group decision making where
each group member may have a different level of risk tolerance.
Interestingly, we show that for newsvendors under ESM, all the results
in Section 2.1 still hold, which suggests that our model is robust with respect
to the way decision makers perceive risks. Theorem 4 below summarizes the
results.
Theorem 4. For newsvendors maximizing the Entropic satisficing measure,
the following holds:
1. Assume that τ1 ≥ τ2. Then there must exist y1 ≥ y2 ≥ 0 such that
yi ∈ argmax
y≥0
ρEτi (v˜(y)), i ∈ {1, 2}.
2. If τ is greater than (equal to, or less than) E [v˜(yN)], then we can




3. If τ = α×(p−c), where α is a positive value depends on the knowledge
of d˜ alone. Then ∃ζ ∈ [0, 1] such that if p−c
p
≥ ζ , ∃y∗ ≤ yN and y∗ ∈
argmax
y≥0
ρEτi (v˜(y)); and if
p−c
p









ρEτ (v˜(y)) = argmax
y≥0
Cη(v˜(y)).
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Proof. 1) By the same argument as we made in the proof of Theorem 1, we
look at the existence of yi ∈ [d, d¯] to prove the result.
By definition, we can easily check that maxy≥0 ρ
E
τ1 (v˜(y)) ≤ maxy≥0 ρ
E
τ2 (v˜(y))




(v˜(y)) = −∞, we have ρEτ1 (v˜(y)) = −∞ for all y. Choose







τ2 (v˜(y)) = ∞. Let y
∗ ∈ [d, d¯] be an order quantity such
that ρτ2 (v˜ (y
∗)) = ∞. By Lemma 3, P (v˜ (y∗) ≥ τ2) = 1, which implies
−cy∗+ pd ≥ τ2. Hence, we have −cd+ pd ≥ τ2, and ρτ2 (v˜ (d)) =∞. Choose
y2 = d. For any y1 ∈ [d, d¯] such that ρτ1 (v˜(y1)) = maxy≥0 ρ
E
τ1 (v˜(y)), we have
y1 ≥ y2.




∞. Given τ , let ητ be the maximal value of the ESM, i.e., ητ = maxy≥0 ρEτ (v˜(y)).
Further, for the case of ητ ∈ (−∞,∞), let yτ be the maximizer of Cητ (v˜(y)),
i.e., yτ = argmaxy≥0Cητ (v˜(y)).









E [− exp (−ητ v˜(y))] , if ητ ∈ (0,∞);
argmax
y≥0
E [v˜(y)] , if ητ = 0;
argmax
y≥0
E [exp (−ητ v˜(y))] , if ητ ∈ (−∞, 0).
Hence, we know yτ is also a maximizer of the expectation of a utility function
uτ (·), where uτ (w) = −sign(ητ ) exp(−ητw) if ητ 6= 0, and uτ (w) = w if
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ητ = 0.
Since τ1 ≥ τ2, we know −∞ < ητ1 ≤ ητ2 < ∞. If 0 < ητ1 ≤ ητ2 ,
uτ1(w) = − exp(−ητ1w) and uτ2(w) = − exp(−ητ2w). Both are nondecreasing
concave functions, and there exists nondecreasing concave function f(·) such
that u2(w) = f(u1(w)) for all w. Therefore, yτ2 ≤ yτ1 ≤ yN (Eeckhoudt et al.
1995).
If ητ1 ≤ ητ2 < 0, uτ1(w) = exp(−ητ1w) and uτ2(w) = exp(−ητ2w). Both
are nondecreasing convex functions, and there exists nondecreasing convex
function f(·) such that u1(w) = f(u2(w)) for all w. Therefore, by Lemma 4,
yτ1 ≥ yτ2 ≥ yN .
If ητ1 ≤ 0 ≤ ητ2 , then u1(·) is nondecreasing convex function while u2(·)
is nondecreasing concave function. So we get yτ1 ≥ yN ≥ yτ2.
2) While τ = maxy≥0 E [v˜(y)], we know ητ = 0 and yτ = yN . Others can
be derived from part 1).
3) The proof is similar to that for Theorem 3.
4) It is obvious from the binary search procedure to find the solution for
optimizing ESM.
2.3 Computational Analysis
In this section we conduct a numerical study to compare the ordering deci-
sions using our target based approaches (maximizing CSM and ESM) with
those from maximizing expected profit, maximizing attainment probability,
and the model of mean-variance analysis which is formulated by Choi et al.






s.t. E [v˜(y)] ≥ τ (2.13)
y ≥ 0.
We let the demand follow a discrete uniform distribution over {1, 2, . . . , 100}.
Note that for given demand, a newsvendor instance can be characterized by
the selling price and the critical-fractile. To capture a wide range of sce-
narios, we generate 50 newsvendor instances, where for each instance, the
price is randomly sampled from the distribution U [10, 20], and the crit-
ical fractile from U [0.2, 0.8]. For the models involving target profit, we
set target τ = ϕmaxy≥0 E[v˜(y)], where ϕ is a parameter describing the
distance the target is away from the maximal expected profit. We have
ϕ = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3}. For each newsvendor instance, we first find
the optimal ordering quantity for each model, and then compute the perfor-
mances of the optimal decision with respect to different measures. Note that
computational complexity is not an issue for newsvendor problem because it
involves only one dimensional search if a closed form solution is unavailable.
We do not take expected utility approach as a benchmark since it is not
clear what utility function to use, and hence a fair comparison is hard to be
achieved. Even with the popular exponential utility, u(x) = 1 − exp(−ηx),
the solution is sensitive to risk averse parameter η, which is an abstract
concept and hard to be estimated. For example, with current demand dis-
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tribution, if p = 12 and c = 6, the optimal ordering quantity will be 44 if
η = 0.001, 20 if η = 0.01, 5 if η = 0.1, and 1 if η = 1.
Table 2.1 shows the average performance of all the 50 instances for each
target level specified by ϕ. Note that when ϕ > 1, the mean-variance model
in (2.13) is infeasible so we provide the solutions for this model only for ϕ ≤ 1.
Here Expected Loss (EL) is the expected value of the loss with respect to the
target; Conditional Expected Loss (CEL) is the expected value of the loss
conditioning on that there is a strictly positive loss. Value at Risk (VaR)
is the threshold value that the newsvendor’s loss does not exceed with a
specified probability level. Note that for EL, CEL, and VaR, low values are
desirable because they all measure losses.
We first observe that the optimal ordering decision for the attainment
probability model is always the most conservative in the sense that compared
to the optimal solutions for other models, it gives the lowest expected profit,
standard deviation, expected loss, conditional expected loss, and VaR. This
is because the optimal solution of the attainment probability model, τ/(p−c)
(Lau 1980), is one such that the profit can never exceed τ . This is very con-
servative in nature. But for other models involving target, we require the
expected profit (mean variance model), conditional expected profit (CSM
model), or certainty equivalent (ESM model) to be no less than the target.
Therefore, the optimal decisions of these models must not be as conservative
as that in the attainment probability model. Note that although the at-
tainment probability solution gives the lowest expected profit, the resulting
lowest standard deviation and various types of losses makes it perhaps the
best decision model to apply for newsvendors who just start their business
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Approach
Criterion
ϕ Expected Standard Attainment
EL CEL
VaR VaR
profit deviation probability @ 95% @ 99%
0.7
Expected profit 223 246 67.42% 81 241 258 318
Attainment probability 132 65 81.78% 27 137 47 106
Mean variance 158 91 79.30% 33 151 80 139
CSM 203 159 74.10% 51 190 158 217
ESM 196 146 75.38% 47 182 140 199
0.8
Expected profit 223 246 65.88% 89 252 258 318
Attainment probability 146 78 79.16% 35 156 64 123
Mean variance 180 120 75.54% 47 179 113 173
CSM 214 189 70.28% 68 218 191 250
ESM 211 180 71.08% 64 211 179 238
0.9
Expected profit 223 246 64.28% 98 263 258 318
Attainment probability 159 92 76.40% 45 176 81 141
Mean variance 202 158 71.10% 65 212 157 216
CSM 221 218 66.58% 86 247 225 284
ESM 220 214 67.00% 84 244 219 279
1.1
Expected profit 223 246 61.20% 116 285 258 318
Attainment probability 181 120 71.10% 67 215 114 174
CSM 223 254 60.40% 120 291 270 329
ESM 221 275 58.58% 131 304 297 356
1.2
Expected profit 223 246 59.70% 126 297 258 318
Attainment probability 190 135 68.50% 80 235 131 190
CSM 222 262 58.22% 134 308 280 340
ESM 215 298 54.88% 155 333 331 390
1.3
Expected profit 223 246 58.02% 136 307 258 318
Attainment probability 198 150 65.80% 94 254 148 207
CSM 221 270 55.98% 149 324 290 350
ESM 207 319 51.14% 181 359 362 421
EL=Expected Loss; CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
Tab. 2.1: Performance of Various Newsvendor Models
venture, because the most important concern for start-ups is survival, the
consequence of losses can be unbearable for them.
In the low target scenarios (ϕ < 1), the mean-variance model gives the
second most conservative solution. The reason is that the optimal solution for
this model is such that the expected profit is equal to the target (Choi et al.
2008). However, the two satisficing models have optimal solutions with η
greater than zero. A positive η under CSM suggests that CV aRη reaches the
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target, whereas under ESM this implies the certainty equivalent achieving the
target. As such, the expected profit under both satisficing measures should
be larger than the target.
Compared to the risk-neutral model that maximizes the expected profit,
for CSM and ESM, when the target is smaller than E[v˜(yN)], the decrease
in the target results in a decrease in the expected profit as well as the s-
tandard deviation and the loss-related performance measures (EL, CEL, and
VaR). However, the decrease in the profit (maximum at 12%, 196 vs. 223) is
much more mild than that in the standard deviation and other loss related
measures (maximum at 46%, 228 vs. 118). On the other hand, when the
target is larger than E[v˜(yN)], an increase in the target is associated with
a decrease in the expected profit but an increase in the standard deviation
and the loss-related measures. Similarly, the profit reduction is relatively
mild (maximum at 7%, 207 vs. 223) while the loss-related measures increase
quickly (maximum at 40%, 362 vs. 258). This suggests that compared to the
risk-neutral model, CSM and ESM perform relatively well when the target is
low. Further, compared to the attainment probability model, CSM and ESM
have an advantage on the resulting expected profit, which is most significant
when the target is small.
Finally, as the value of ϕ approaches to one (from both sides), we ob-
serve that the performance difference between different models decreases.
The reason is that as the target moves close to the maximal expected profit,
all target based models (except the attainment probability model) provide
solutions close to the risk neutral one. As such, the difference becomes s-
maller.
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To illustrate the effectiveness of our target-based approach, we compare
the solutions from ESM approach under two different targets, and the so-
lutions from the expected exponential utility approach. While the single-
product newsvendor problem leads to random profit with a simple CDF
curve (same shape as the CDF curve of demand distribution when under-
age, and jump to 1 when overage), we consider the extension to the multi-
products newsvendor problem such that the CDF curve of random profit is
more meaningful for comparison. In the multi-products newsvendor prob-
lem, the newsvendor can order product i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} at unit cost of ci,
and sell it at unit price pi . The random demand of product i is d˜i, which
is independent from demands of other products. With the criterion of ESM,








−ciyi + pimin{yi, d˜i}
))
. (2.14)
By Definition 2, in order to solve the problem (2.14), we can perform a binary
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(−ciyi + pimin{yi, d˜i})] if η = 0. Since each demand is
independent from others, the subproblem can be decomposed into n single-
product newsvendor problems and hence can be solved. With the criterion
of expected exponential utility, the problem is equivalent to (2.15).
In this numerical study, we let n = 10, pi = 12 and ci = 6 for all i ∈
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{1, 2, . . . , n}. The random demand for each of the ten products is uniformly
distributed in [1, 100]. Similar to previous computational study, we first solve
solutions for all approaches, including ESM with τ = 1080 and τ = 2020,
expected exponential utility with η = 0.001, η = 0.01, η = 0.1, and η = 1.
Then we run simulation and compare different solutions on the CDF of the
random profit. We can see Figure 2.2 for comparison. At first, we observe
that the result from expected exponential utility is closely dependent on the
selection of η, the abstractness of which limits the applicability. Comparing
the two solutions from ESM, the solution from τ = 1080 can achieve the
target of 1080 better, in the sense that its loss respect to 1080 is less in both
frequency and magnitude. On the other hand, the solution from τ = 2020 can
attain the target of 2020 better, since the solution from τ = 1080 cannot beat
the target at all. This comparison shows that the ESM approach provides
solution beating the target well.





























Expected exponential utility 
with risk averse parameter α
Fig. 2.2: CDF of random profits from solution of different approaches.
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2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we incorporate the target profit in newsvendor decision mak-
ing. By adopting the concept of satisficing measure (Brown et al. 2012), we
study two measures: 1) CVaR satisficing measure (CSM) which measures
the highest confidence level η which guarantees CV aRη achieving the target;
and 2) Entropic satisficing measure (ESM) which measures the smallest risk
tolerance level under which the certainty equivalent for an exponential utility
function achieves the target.
We provide a method to easily find the optimal solution for the CSM
framework, whereas for ESM the optimal decision can be numerically found.
For both the two satisficing measures we find that i) the optimal order quan-
tity increases with the target; ii) the newsvendor orders more than the risk
neutral solution sometimes and order less other times, depending on the tar-
get level; and iii) if the target is proportional to the unit marginal profit and is
also affected by only one other demand related factor, then the newsvendor
over-orders the low-profit products and under-orders the high-profit prod-
ucts, which is consistent with the behavioral observation made by multiple
studies. While Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) argue that “new techniques
may be required to correctly optimize these systems”, the consistency of our
theoretical results and the existing behavioral observations suggest that our
modelling framework may provides a potential direction in looking for the
new techniques.
Most inventory models up to date focus on the absolute performance
such as the expected profit. With ample evidence (e.g. Brown and Tang
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2006) suggesting that managers are more concerned about achieving a target,
our target-based framework opens a new direction for future research. We
hope that our work would motivate increasing research interest along this
avenue. We believe that it is worthwhile extending this framework to other
operations management models to investigate how target affects decision
making. It would also be interesting to study how people form their target
profit in practice. Are there any heuristics that decision makers can follow
or they simply use their intuition? Though past research has highlighted
the role of target, few works have in fact analyzed the target formation.
Although we proposed an intuitive target format in this chapter, we expect
that more research remains to be done in this direction. Finally, while our
results are consistent with the existing behavioral observations in laboratory
experiments, we are in fact postulating that the subjects in these experiments
are unconsciously setting targets. It is therefore worth further investigation
to test this assumption.
2.5 Preliminary Lemmas 2 to 4
We now introduce Lemmas 2 to 4, which are used for subsequent proof of
theorems.
Lemma 2. Given v˜ ∈ B and τ ∈ ℜ, ρτ (v˜) = 1 if and only P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1.
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Proof. If P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1, ∀η ∈ (0, 1),











E[min{v˜ − τ, 0}]
= τ,
where the second inequality holds for P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1. Therefore, ρτ (v˜) = 1.
If P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1− 2δ < 0, where δ ∈ (0, 1/2], we have











with h(a) = 1
δ
E [min {v˜ − a, 0}]. For a < τ , a + h(a) ≤ a < τ . For a = τ ,
a + h(a) = τ + h(τ) < τ , where the inequality holds because P (v˜ ≥ τ) < 1.
For a > τ ,





(z − a)dF (z) +
∫ a
τ








((τ − a) · 2δ + 0 + 0)
= 2τ − a
< τ.
Therefore, we must have CV aR1−δ (v˜) < τ , ρτ (v˜) < 1.
Lemma 3. Given v˜ ∈ B and τ ∈ ℜ, ρEτ (v˜) =∞ if and only P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1.
Proof. If P (v˜ ≥ τ) = 1, we can easily check that Cη (v˜) ≥ τ for all η.
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Therefore, ρEτ (v˜) =∞.
If P (v˜ ≥ τ) < 1, ∃∆ < τ such that P (v˜ ≤ ∆) = δ ∈ (0, 1). Denote the
upper bound of v˜ as v¯.
lim
η→∞

















ln (exp(−η∆) (δ + (1− δ) exp(−η(v¯ −∆))))
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Therefore, ρτ (v˜) <∞.
Lemma 4. Assume u1, u2, and f are nondecreasing convex functions from ℜ
to ℜ, such that u1(w) = f(u2(w)), ∀ w ∈ ℜ. Then ∃y1 ≥ y2 ≥ yN , such that
yi ∈ argmaxy≥0 E [ui(v˜(y))], i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. For i ∈ {1, 2}, denote ti(y) = E [ui (v˜(y))]. Let y2 be a maximizer
of t2(·) on ℜ+, i.e., t2(y2) ≥ t2(y) for all y ≥ 0. To prove the existence of
2. The Impact of a Target on Newsvendor Decisions 39












u′1(pd− cy)dF (d) + (p− c)u
′






2(pd− cy)dF (d) + (p− c)f
′(u2(py − cy))u
′
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where m1 = y if t
′
2(y) < 0, and m1 = max{r ≤ y2 : ∀x ∈ [y, r], t
′
2(x) ≥ 0}
otherwise. Since y2 is a maximizer of t2(·), we can let
ni = max{r : ∀x ∈ [mi, r], t
′
2(x) ≤ 0}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1,
mi+1 = max{r ≤ y2 : ∀x ∈ [ni, r], t
′
2(x) ≥ 0}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1,
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where the second inequality holds since s(x) is nondecreasing and t′2(x) is non-
positive when x ∈ [mi, ni] and non-negative when x ∈ [ni, mi+1]; the following




Therefore, we get t1(y2)−t1(y) ≥ s(n1)(t2(y2)−t2(m1)) ≥ 0 and t1(y2) ≥
t1(y), ∀y ∈ [0, y2]. Therefore, we know that ∃y1 ≥ y2 such that y1 is the
maximizer of t1(·) on ℜ+.
Moreover, let u3(w) = w. Then u3 : ℜ → ℜ is an increasing convex
function and u2(w) = u2(u3(w)) for any w. Let t3(y) = E [u3(v˜(y))], and
y3 be the maximizer of t3(·) on ℜ+. Then from the proof above we know
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y2 ≥ y3 = yN , where the equality holds from the definition of yN and y3.
3. MANAGING OPERATIONAL AND FINANCING
DECISIONS TO MEET CONSUMPTION TARGETS
Firms plan their operational decisions such as procurement, production, and
inventory replenishment to generate cash flow for day-to-day expenditures
(e.g., wages, dividend payments, and R&D costs) and more importantly, to
grow the company. Due to multiple sources of randomness (e.g., demand
volatility) embedded in the business environment, cash flow arising from any
operational decision is risky and this complicates the decision making pro-
cess. In principle, an analyst could construct a dynamic model to evaluate
a decision that will reveal the corresponding cash flow profile, i.e., the prob-
ability distributions of the present values of the risky cash flow over time.
The overarching challenges in a dynamic decision problem are to determine
the appropriate decision criterion that translates the preference of the de-
cision maker and also to find the “best” policy in which the criterion is
optimized. Unfortunately, such a problem often suffers from the “curse of
dimensionality” and its computational tractability depends critically on size
of the underlying state-space, which may be aggravated by the choice of de-
cision criterion. Even in the simplest setting where decision makers are risk
neutral, finding the optimal policy that maximizes the expected net present
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value of the consumptions profile is #P-hard and possibly PSPACE-hard;
see Dyer and Stougie (2006). Nevertheless, the optimal risk neutral policies
of many important dynamic decision problems with smaller state space can
be analyzed and solved via Bellman’s (1957) dynamic programming.
Despite the technical attractiveness of risk neutral decision criteria, they
neglect the risks involved in the operational cash flows and may not appeal to
managers who are averse to potential losses along the planning horizon. They
also ignore the fact that decision makers can be sensitive to the timing of
the resolution of uncertainties. For example, suppose a firm will have a risky
cash flow 10 years from now, knowing it today can be preferred than know-
ing it 10 years later because by having the knowledge of the cash flow today,
managers can better plan (through borrowing and lending) corporate activi-
ties such as expansion and investment in new technology. Markowitz (1959),
Matheson and Howard (1984) among others recognize this as the problem of
“temporal risk.” In order to resolve this problem, decision makers should
be allowed to borrow or lend to smooth out consumptions over the planning
horizon. In the corporate world, consumptions can refer to expenditures such
as wages, dividend payments, and R&D costs. More details on “temporal
risk problem” can be found in Smith (1998).
Recognizing the risks in the operational cash flow as well as the temporal
risk, we study a firm’s operational and financing decisions concurrently by
modelling a finite horizon dynamic decision problem. We refer to operational
decisions as those (e.g., production quantity and inventory planning) that
would directly affect the operational cash flow in response to underlying un-
certainties, and financing decisions as the amount of money the firm borrows
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or lends through financial markets. In every period except for the last, the
total cash flow arising from the operational and financing decisions is the
firm’s consumption. To illustrate, if the firm needs to consume more than
the operational cash flow, she’ll borrow from the financial markets at a cost
and if she consumes less, she will lend and earn the interest. The consump-
tion in the final period is defined as the total wealth of the company in the
consideration that a firm’s ultimate goal is to grow the company. We define
consumptions profile as the probability distributions of the present values of
the risky consumptions over time.
One widely adopted criterion for evaluating the consumptions profile is
expected utility, which captures decision maker’s risk awareness and also has
strong normative basis. Dynamic programming under the expected utility
criterion has been proposed and studied by Howard and Matheson (1972),
Porteus (1975) and Jaquette (1976) among others. Smith (1998) shows that
under an additive-exponential utility function, joint operational and financ-
ing decisions can be made without overburdening the analysis. In the context
of inventory management, Chen et al. (2007) show that this approach also
preserves the structures of optimal joint inventory replenishment and pricing
policies and hence, extends the result of Bouakiz and Sobel (1992).
However, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is of great interest to consid-
er the effect of targets in this decision problem. To this end, we pro-
pose a new dynamic decision criterion, Consumptions Profile Riskiness Index
(CPRI), that evaluates the prospects of a consumptions profile in achiev-
ing consumptions targets over time. This decision criterion is especially
of practical meaning, as an important aspect of managers’ decision mak-
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ing is attainment of predetermined targets (of consumption levels, profits,
or company stock prices), which is a direct reflection of their performance.
Simon (1955), who has coined the term satisfice, elucidates that most firm-
s’ goals are not maximizing profits but attaining their target profits. From
the interviews of executives in large corporations, Lanzillotti (1958) con-
cludes that managers are primarily concerned about target returns on in-
vestment. Likewise, Mao (1970) also concludes from his empirical study
that managers perceived risk as the “prospect of not meeting some tar-
get rate of return”. From the normative perspective, research interests
in target-oriented utility can be traced to Borch (1968) and have rekin-
dled in recent years (Bordley and LiCalzi 2000, Bordley and Kirkwood 2004,
Castagnoli and Calzi 1996, Tsetlin and Winkler 2007).
Our decision criterion CPRI is based on the extension of the riskiness
index axiomatized by Aumann and Serrano (2008). Under this criterion, a
joint operational and financing decision that returns the lowest CPRI is most
preferred. We show that if there is no limit on the amount of borrowing and
lending (full financing), all consumption targets, except the terminal one,
are met with certainty. Moreover, the optimal policy of this criterion has the
same control state as the optimal risk neutral policy and could be achieved
with relatively modest computational effort. When financing is restricted,
we show that for convex dynamic decision problems, the optimal policies
correspond to those that optimize expected additive-exponential utilities.
We also provide an algorithm to find the optimal policies.
Applying the CPRI decision framework to the joint inventory-pricing de-
cision problem, we identify the optimal inventory and pricing policies for the
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case of with fixed ordering cost under full financing, and the policy structures
for the case of zero fixed ordering cost under restricted financing. These re-
sults fill the void of inventory and inventory-pricing literature which has been
mainly focused on risk neutral decision and expected utility to incorporate
risk aversion. With our numerical studies for inventory control problems,
we also report favorable computational results for using targets in regulating
uncertain consumptions over time.
Structure of the chapter. Section 3.1 introduces the decision criterion
CPRI. Section 3.2 discusses a general framework for joint operational and
financing decisions under the CPRI. Optimal policies are provided for both
the scenarios of full and restricted financing. Section 3.3 applies CPRI to
a joint inventory and pricing decision problem and identifies the optimal
inventory replenishment and pricing policies. Section 3.4 presents numerical
results for inventory control problems. We conclude the chapter in Section
3.5.
3.1 Consumptions profile riskiness index (CPRI)
In this section, we propose a new decision criterion for evaluating the prospect-
s of a consumptions profile in achieving consumptions targets over time. Al-
though the joint probability of achieving targets is a natural candidate for
a target-oriented decision criterion, Diecidue and Van de Ven (2008) argue
against success probability as it tacitly assumes that the decision maker is
indifferent to the magnitude of the losses when they occur. Our criterion is
built upon the riskiness index recently axiomatized by Aumann and Serrano
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(2008).
We first introduce some general notations used in the chapter. A vector
such as x is represented as a boldface character and xi denotes the ith com-
ponent of the vector. In particular, 1 represents a vector of ones. Let C be
a set of random variables on Ω in which c˜ ∈ C denotes the present values of
the uncertain consumptions that will be realized in future.





∣∣∣ Cα(c˜) ≥ 0, α > 0} (3.1)
where Cα : C 7→ ℜ is the certainty equivalent function defined as
Cα(c˜) = −α lnE [exp (−c˜/α)] .
By convention, we define inf ∅ =∞.
Aumann and Serrano (2008) interpret the riskiness index as the recipro-
cal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an individual with constant ARA
who is indifferent between accepting and not accepting the uncertain con-
sumptions. (While c˜ can refer to any random position such as investment
return, we specifically call it consumption in the context of this chapter.) Un-
certain consumptions with lower riskiness index appeal to a greater subset of
individuals who are willing to accept the uncertain consumptions over noth-
ing. The riskiness index has the same unit as the underlying consumptions
and has the following properties (Aumann and Serrano 2008). It is positively
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homogeneous, i.e.,
ρ(kc˜) = kρ(c˜) ∀k ≥ 0,
and subadditive, i.e., for all c˜1, c˜2 ∈ C,
ρ(c˜1 + c˜2) ≤ ρ(c˜1) + ρ(c˜2).
The positively homogeneous property reflects upon the cardinal nature of
riskiness such that kc˜ is k times as risky as c˜. Subadditivity implies that
pooling of consumptions is less risky than the sum of the individual parts.
These two properties imply that the riskiness index is also a convex function
and hence consistent with convex preference. Furthermore, the riskiness
index is monotone with second-order stochastic dominance and therefore it
is a suitable decision making criterion for risk averse individuals.
Brown and Sim (2009) show that the riskiness index can be extended
to a target-oriented decision criterion by evaluating the riskiness index of
the consumption excesses over targets, c˜ − τ , where τ ∈ ℜ is the target
at present value. The target-oriented riskiness index embodies the proper-
ty of satisficing, i.e., ρ(c˜ − τ) = 0 if and only if P(c˜ ≥ τ) = 1. Hence,
similar to the probability measure, uncertain consumptions that can almost
surely achieve the target will be most preferred and equally valued. Howev-
er, unlike probability measure, this target-oriented criterion is diversification
favoring and also rejects consumptions that fail to meet their targets in ex-
pectation, i.e., if E[c˜] < τ then ρ(c˜ − τ) = ∞. We call this property loss
aversion awareness, which captures the effect of loss aversion described by
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that, the disutility of losses below the refer-
ence point or target is far larger than the value derived from the same size of
gains. The loss aversion awareness property is reflected in Payne et al. (1980,
1981), which studies that managers tend to eradicate investment possibilities
that underperform against their targets. Further, Brown et al. (2012) show
that the target-oriented riskiness index can resolve several well-known behav-
ioral experiments that contradict the expected utility theory. To illustrate
this, we present the gambles of Allais’ paradox in Table 3.1. Most subjects
prefer Gamble A over Gamble B and Gamble C over Gamble D and this
preference cannot be resolved by expected utility and also success probabili-
ty, which can be perceived as a form of expected utility with step function.
In contrast, this preference can be resolved via the target-oriented riskiness
index. In particular, preferences for Gamble A over Gamble B and Gamble
C over Gamble D are strict if τ ∈ (.023M, 0.25M ]. For τ ∈ (0.25M, 0.5M ],
Gamble A is strictly preferred over Gamble B, while both Gambles C and
D are equally disliked since the expectation of the gambles are less than the
target, τ 1.
Tab. 3.1: Gambles in Allais’ paradox
Gamble A Wins $0.5M for sure.
Gamble B Wins $0M with 1% chance, $2.5M with 10% chance,
and $0.5M with 89% chance.
Gamble C Wins $0M with 90% chance, and $2.5M with 10% chance.
Gamble D Wins $0M with 89% chance, and $0.5M with 11% chance.
1 In Brown et al. (2012) aspirations measure, which incorporates risk seeking behavior
and hence generalizes Brown and Sim (2009) sacrificing measures, the strict preference
can be extended to τ ∈ (.023M, 0.5M ].
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Motivated by the normative and behavioral relevance of the target-
oriented riskiness index, we generalize this approach and propose the new de-
cision criterion CPRI for evaluating the prospect of a consumptions profile in
achieving future targets. Let a vector of T random variables c˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜T )
denote the decision maker’s consumptions profile from period 1 to T , where
c˜t ∈ C is the present value of the uncertain consumption that will realize in
period t. τ = (τ1, . . . , τT ) is a deterministic T -dimensional vector to repre-
sent the pre-determined consumptions targets from 1 to T , with τt as the
present value of the consumption target in period t. (Note that if the inter-
est rate compounded at every period is β, then the future consumption and
target in period t would be (1 + β)tc˜t and (1 + β)
tτt, respectively.) Also let
Cdim(τ ) be the set of random vectors that have the same dimension as τ .
Definition 4. The consumptions profile riskiness index (CPRI) of a con-
sumptions profile c˜ with respect to the vector of targets τ is a function,




ρ(c˜t − τt). (3.2)
Essentially, the CPRI criterion is the sum of riskiness indices of the
present values of the consumption excesses over targets. The present values
are used to resolve the time value incompatibility of riskiness over differen-
t periods. The evaluation of the uncertain consumptions in each period is
compartmentalized and hence, if there exist a period t with disfavoring un-
certain consumptions such that ρ(c˜t−τt) =∞, then the consumptions profile
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will be least favored, i.e., ϕτ (c˜) =∞. On the other hand, the most favored
consumptions profile, i.e., ϕτ (c˜) = 0 will require the stringent condition that
all future consumptions attain their targets almost surely.
Proposition 2. The CPRI criterion, ϕτ : Cdim(τ ) 7→ [0,∞] has the following
properties:
1. Satisficing: ϕτ (c˜) = 0 if and only if P(c˜ ≥ τ ).
2. Loss aversion awareness: If there exists a time period t such that
E[c˜t] < τt then ϕτ (c˜) =∞.
3. Convexity: For all c˜1, c˜2 ∈ Cdim(τ ),
ϕτ (λc˜1 + (1− λ)c˜2) ≤ λϕτ (c˜1) + (1− λ)ϕτ (c˜2).
4. Subadditivity: For all c˜ ∈ Cdim(τ ),
ϕτ (c˜) ≥ ϕ1′τ (1
′c˜) ,
Proof. The first two properties are trivial to show. The last two properties
follow directly from the homogeneity and subadditivity of riskiness index.
We note that the convexity and subadditivity properties of the CPRI
criterion have important ramifications that ensure tractable analysis in dy-
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namic decision problems, which we will discuss in the next section.
3.2 Optimizing the CPRI criterion
We consider a firm making operational decisions (e.g., inventory planning,
procurement) in the presence of uncertainties such as demand variability and
supply volatility. The resulting cash flow from operational decisions are used
for consumption as well as increasing firm’s wealth (or value in other words).
The firm has access to financial markets to borrow or lend at an interest rate
of β in order to smooth out consumptions over the planning horizon T . With
the objective of minimizing the CPRI, the firm needs to make operational as
well as financing decisions in every period.
We have z˜t : Ω 7→ ℜn, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} represent the vector of uncer-
tainties in period t, which are independently distributed and resolved over-
time. We further define the n× t vector ζt = (z1, . . . , zt), t ∈ {1, . . . , T} as
the realizations of the uncertainties at the end of period t. We also define
ζ0 = {}. For convenience, we define the index sets, T = {1, . . . , T} and
T − = {1, . . . , T − 1}.
The sequence of events in any period t, t ∈ T − is as follows: I) At
the beginning of the period, the firm observes her state of wealth wt and
operational state of the system, xt, which is an element in ℜst . II) The
firm then administers an operational control ut, which takes values in a
nonempty set Ut(xt) ⊆ ℜvt , i.e., ut ∈ Ut(xt). III) Near the end of the
period, the uncertainty z˜t is resolved and takes a value of zt, which results
in an operational cash flow of rt = gt(xt,ut, zt). The operational state of
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the system is updated as xt+1 = f t(xt,ut, zt). IV) The firm then makes
the financing decision to borrow bt (or lend if bt < 0). In the event that
the financing is restricted, we note that it can be constrained by the firm’s
wealth level wt and also depends on the system’s updated operational state
xt+1. So we assume bt ∈ Ft(xt+1, wt). For the case of full financing, we
have Ft(·, ·) = ℜ and in the absence of financing, we have Ft(·, ·) = {0}. V)
Finally, the state of wealth is updated as wt+1 = (1 + β)wt − bt.
The sequence of events in the terminal period T is the same as that
for earlier periods except that there is no financing decision involved, i.e.,
bT = 0. This is because we require all outstanding borrowing and interest
earning to be settled by the end of period T so that the firm does not have
outstanding balances. Given the different events in the terminal period and
other periods, the present values of the consumptions over the horizon are
given as follows. For t ∈ T −, ct = (rt + bt)/(1 + β)t and in the terminal
period, cT = (rT +(1+β)wT )/(1+β)
T .Taking a closer look at cT , we can see
that it represents the accumulated wealth gained from the operational cash
flow subtracting the consumptions made in earlier periods.
Definition 5. An operations control state sot ∈ ℜ
lot , t ∈ T is non-anticipative
if it is only influenced by the resolved uncertainty of ζt−1 and uninfluenced by




t ∈ T − is non-anticipative if it is only influenced by the resolved uncertainty
of ζt and uninfluenced by future uncertainty z˜t+1, . . . , z˜T .
We highlight that the operational state xt refers to the state of the
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system in the current period t, and operations (financing) control state sot (s
f
t )
governs the operational (financing) policies in period t, which can contain
more or less information than xt.
Definition 6. An admissible operational policy is a sequence of T measurable
functions given by Π = {pi1, . . . ,piT} where pit : ℜl
o
t 7→ ℜvt maps from a non-
anticipative operations control state sot into operational control ut = pit(s
o
t )
and is such that pit(s
o
t ) ∈ Ut(xt) for all possible states s
o
t . Likewise, an
admissible financing policy is a sequence of T −1 measurable functions given
by Φ = {φ1, . . . , φT−1} where φt : ℜl
f
t 7→ ℜ maps from a non-anticipative
financing control state sft into financing decision bt = φt(s
f
t ) and is such that
φt(s
f
t ) ∈ Ft(xt+1, wt) for all states s
f
t .
We let P be the set of all admissible operational and financing policies.
Starting with an initial operational state x1, an initial wealth w1, and an
admissible policy, Ψ = (Π,Φ) ∈ P, the operational states x˜t and the wealth
of the firm w˜t are random variables with distributions defined through the
following system equations:




w˜t+1 = (1 + β)w˜t − φt(s˜
f
t )
for all t ∈ T −. The consumptions at the end of period t is a random variable







t ), z˜t) + φt(s˜
f
t )/(1 + β)
t if t ∈ T −,
(gT (x˜T ,piT (s˜
0
T ), z˜T ) + (1 + β)w˜T )/(1 + β)
T if t = T .
We define c˜(Ψ) = (c˜1(Ψ), . . . , c˜T (Ψ)) to represent the consumptions profile
as a function of the operational and financing policies, Ψ ∈ P.
Definition 7. A history dependent policy is an admissible policy in which the
control states are the history of resolved uncertainties, i.e.,
sot = ζt−1 t ∈ T ,
s
f
t = ζt t ∈ T
−.
We define PH as the set of all admissible history dependent operational and
financing policies.
Note that sot+1 = s
f
t . This is because by the sequence of events described
earlier, there is one time period lag between the operations control states and
the financing control states.
In classical dynamic programming in which expected reward is maxi-
mized, the optimal policy is usually dependent on system states instead of
being superfluously dependent on its history. However, depending on the de-
cision criterion, the system states may not necessarily be sufficient to describe
the optimal policy. Nevertheless, although there exists an history dependent
policy that is also optimal, such a policy can lead to the “curse of dimen-
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sionality” and are computationally intractable to implement in practice. In
subsequent sections, we will show that in some interesting cases, optimal
control policies may also be concisely dependent on system states, which has
important ramifications on computations.
The consumptions profile that minimizes the target-oriented CPRI cri-
terion and the associated optimal policy can be obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
ϕ∗ = min ϕτ (c˜(Ψ))
s.t. Ψ ∈ PH ,
(3.3)
where ϕτ is defined as in (3.2).
By the expressions of c˜t introduced in the earlier part of Section 3.2, we
know that c˜t, t ∈ T − refers to the consumption and c˜T refers to the firm’s
wealth increase after consumptions in the previous periods. The target-
oriented CPRI framework is thus consistent with such a scenario that when
managers make decisions for a planning horizon, while meeting day-to-day
corporate consumptions such as labor cost is important, at the end of the
horizon, what’s more crucial is whether achieving a pre-determined target
profit, which often plays a significant role in managers’ performance evalua-
tion.
In this model, we say a policy Ψ ∈ PH is feasible if ϕτ (c˜(Ψ)) < ∞.
Hence, we assume that the decision maker can aptly set her targets, τ so
that ϕ∗ ∈ (0,∞).
There are several criticisms of Model (3.3) which are related to the set-
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ting of targets. If there exist some policies such that their corresponding
consumptions profiles achieve the targets almost surely, then ϕ∗ = 0 and the
CPRI criterion cannot distinguish among any of these profiles. In the other
extreme, if there does not exist a policy that yields a consumptions profile
with finite CPRI, then ϕ∗ = ∞ and this framework would fail to obtain a
feasible policy. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that targets
are set based on the perceived economic outlook and one could argue that
the decision maker is not overly pessimistic or optimistic in setting targets.
Simon (1955) provides an example of selling a house and the agent’s target
is determined after she learns about the climate of the housing market. Sim-
ilarly, we may also argue that one may conjure her targets after examining
the consumptions profiles of some policies such as the risk neutral optimal
policy.
Another related criticism is the lack of time consistency such that an
optimal policy perceived in one time period may not be perceived as optimal
in another. While the decision maker may change her targets as uncertainty
resolves over time, time inconsistency may occur even when her targets re-
main fixated. For instance, it is plausible that when the economic outlook
is bad, the targets imposed at earlier periods may no longer yield a feasible
policy unless the decision maker is willing to lower her targets. Time in-
consistency also occurs in dynamic decision problems with non-exponential
discounting factors. Nevertheless, while time consistency is a desirable fea-
ture in dynamic decision making, it is violated in behavioral experiments even
in the absence of uncertainty; see for instance Thaler (1981), Frederick et al.
(2002), and Loch and Wu (2007). Loewenstein (1988) shows experimental-
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ly that shifts of reference points, or targets in our language, could better
account for behavioral time consistency than discounted utility models. In
some situations, we may circumvent the issue of time inconsistency by sim-
ply adhering to the original policy announced in the first period, which may
be applicable when there are heavy penalties against deviations from origi-
nal plans. In other situations, it may be reasonable to implement a rolling
(or folding) horizon approach to dynamic decision making in which only the
“here-and-now” solution is obtained and implemented in every period with-
out the need to announce future “wait-and-see” policy. This is achieved by
solving the optimization problem based on a fresh set of targets and using
the latest information available whenever we need to make and implement
the decisions.
Despite these valid criticisms, we will next show that in some interesting
cases, optimizing over consumptions profiles under the CPRI criterion can be
made almost as easy as solving the underlying dynamic programming model.
We will also show numerically on an inventory control problem that by using
this approach we can better regulate consumptions over time.
3.2.1 Optimal policy under full financing
We first analyze the case in which the decision maker has unrestricted access
to borrowing and lending to finance consumptions in periods t ∈ T −, which
is similar to the assumptions made in Smith (1998) and Chen et al. (2007)
to obtain tractable analysis. In the absence of financing restrictions, we will
show that there exists an optimal financing policy in which the consumptions
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at periods t ∈ T − are exactly at their targets. We call this a financing-at-
target (FAT) policy.
Definition 8. Given an admissible operational policy Π, the financing-at-
target (FAT) policy is a financing policy Φ = {φ1, . . . , φT−1}, φt : ℜ 7→ ℜ
such that for all t ∈ T −,
φt(rt) = (1 + β)
tτt − rt,
where rt = gt(xt,ut, zt) is the realized operational cash flow in period t under
policy Π.
Theorem 5. Under full financing, there exists an optimal FAT policy that
minimizes the CPRI criterion.
Proof. Let (Π∗,Φ∗) ∈ PH be an optimal admissible history dependent
policy to Model (3.3) in which Φ∗ may not be a FAT policy. For given
operational policy Π∗, we show that the corresponding FAT policy, Φˆ would
not yield a consumptions profile with worse CPRI. The consumptions under











τk for t = T .
where r˜t, t ∈ T is the uncertain operational cash flows under the operational
policy Π∗. Let c˜∗ = (c˜∗1, . . . , c˜
∗
T ) denote the consumptions profile under the
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for t = T .
Hence, by subadditivity property of the CPRI criterion, we have
ϕτ (c˜































ρ(c˜t − τt) + ρ (c˜T − τT )
= ϕτ (c˜) .
The optimality of the FAT policy implies that as long as Model (3.3)
is feasible, one can always attain the desired consumption targets through
financing, with the exception of the last target. Hence, we may perfectly
regulate consumptions in periods t ∈ T − by minimizing the CPRI and in
doing so, relegate consumption uncertainty to the last period. We observe
that the corresponding CPRI of the consumptions profile under the FAT
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where r˜t, t ∈ T are the uncertain operational cash flows. Therefore, we can
















where Q is the set of all admissible operational policies and r˜t(Π) denotes
the uncertain operational cash flows under policy Π ∈ Q. We next present
the optimal operational policy.
Theorem 6. Under full financing, there exists an optimal operational state
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Moreover, Lα1 (x1) is an nondecreasing function of α and hence, ϕ
∗ can be
found by a standard binary search on α.
Proof. In solving Problem (3.4), we observe the certainty equivalent function
Cα is nondecreasing in α ∈ (0,∞) and hence, we can obtain ϕ∗ by standard
binary search on α. For a given parameter, α, the subproblem to maximize
certainty equivalent of total operational cash flows under exponential utility
function can be solved by modifying standard dynamic programming (see
Bertsekas 2005, Volumne 1, p. 53-54) so that









Since this is a standard approach, we omit the proof for brevity.
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3.2.2 Optimal policy for convex dynamic decision problems
We now consider the general case when financing is restricted. Since a FAT
policy may not necessarily be admissible, it would not be always possible to
obtain the optimal policy by solving a small collection of dynamic program-
ming problems as we have done in Theorem 6. Nevertheless, we will focus on
a special class of convex dynamic decision problems in which the structure of
the optimal policies under the CPRI criterion can be analyzed. Analogous
to a convex maximization problem, the feasible policies of a convex dynamic
decision problem is convex and the consumptions are concave functions with
respect to the policies. The first step is to ensure that the feasible set of the
optimization problem is closed, which is necessary for our results to hold.








where ǫ > 0 is a small number. Since Cα(·) is nondecreasing in α, we can
establish that
ϕ∗ ≤ ϕ∗ǫ ≤ ϕ
∗ + Tǫ,
and hence, the optimal policy of Model (3.5) can be made arbitrarily close to
that of Model (3.3). Therefore, with an abuse of terminology, we refer to an
optimal policy of Model (3.5) as one that also minimizes the CPRI criterion.
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From here forward, we assume finite discrete distributions, i.e., Ω =
{ω1, . . . , ωK} and that P{ωk} > 0. While this assumption aims to simplify
the analysis, it is not practically limiting in most applications of dynamic de-
cision problems. Under the assumption of finite sample space, at any point
in time, there are only finitely many possible histories or states that will
influence control decisions. Therefore, the history dependent policies can be
perceived as vectors representing concatenation of controls corresponding to
all the possible control states. Hence, Model (3.5) can be expressed as a finite
dimensional optimization problem. Despite the case, there could be expo-
nentially large number of decision variables and computationally prohibitive
to solve Model (3.5) directly as a mathematical optimization problem. In-
stead, we propose to address the problem by solving a sequence of dynamic
optimization problems, which may enable us to exploit the structures of their
optimal policies for efficient computations. We make further assumptions on
the problem.
Assumption 1. The set of admissible policies PH is closed, bounded, convex,
i.e. for all Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ PH ,
λΨ1 + (1− λ)Ψ2 ∈ PH ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]
and strictly feasible, i.e. ∃Ψ ∈ intPH , where intPH refers to the interior of
PH , such that ϕ(c˜(Ψ)) ∈ [0,∞). The consumptions are concave with respect
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to the policy, i.e, for all t ∈ T ,
c˜t(λΨ
1+(1−λ)Ψ2, ω) ≥ λc˜t(Ψ
1, ω)+(1−λ)c˜t(Ψ
2, ω) ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], ω ∈ Ω.
Theorem 7. Under Assumption 1, the optimal policy under the CPRI cri-
terion is one that maximizes the expected value of an additive-exponential











s.t. Ψ ∈ PH ,
(3.6)
where α > 0 and δ ≥ 0 take some specific values.
Proof. Note for any c˜ ∈ C, α > 0, Cα(c˜) ≥ 0 if and only if αE[exp(−c˜/α)]−




s.t. αtE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)] ≤ αt, t ∈ T
Ψ ∈ PH ,
α ≥ 1ǫ.
(3.7)
We claim that the function αE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τ)/α)] is jointly convex in
(α,Ψ), α > 0. Indeed, given α1, α2 > 0, Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ PH , let αλ = λα1 + (1 −
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where the first inequality holds for the convexity of the dynamic decision
problem, the second inequality follows from the convexity of the exponential
function. Hence, Problem (3.7) is a convex optimization problem with finite
number of decision variables and it is strictly feasible by assumption. We let
this be the primal problem and the Lagrange dual problem follows:
max g(λ)









(αt + λt (αtE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)]− αt)) .
Since the primal problem has finite objective, is convex and strictly feasible,
strong duality holds and the dual variables λ are attainable (See for instance
Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, section 5.2.3). Let (α∗,Ψ∗) be any optimal
solution to the primal problem (3.7), and λ∗ be any optimal solution to the
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Therefore, L(α∗,Ψ∗,λ∗) = minΨ∈PH L(α
∗,Ψ,λ∗), and Ψ∗ is an optimal


















Proposition 3. The optimal policy that maximizes an expected additive-




















V ft (f t(xt,ut, z˜t), wt, gt(xt,ut, z˜t))
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t ∈ T −,































V ft (f t(xt,ut, z˜t), wt, gt(xt,ut, z˜t))
]
t ∈ T −
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+ V ot+1 (xt+1, (1 + β)wt − bt)
}
.
Proof. Following standard dynamic programming procedure, let V ot (xt, wt)
be the maximal value of
∑T
i=t E[−δi exp (−c˜i/αi)] given (xt, wt) at the begin-
ning of period t, t ∈ T . Similarly, let V ft (xt+1, wt, rt) be the maximal value
of
∑T
i=t E[−δi exp (−c˜i/αi)] given wt, rt and xt+1 at the end of period t. We
observe that











and we can obtain V ft (xt+1, wt, rt) and V
o
t (xt, wt) by standard backward in-
duction.
To obtain the optimal policy of Model (3.5), it remains to find the ap-
propriate parameters δ and α. We next present an algorithm for obtaining
the optimal policy as follows.
Algorithm Main
Input: Initial multipliers λ ≥ 0 and parameters α ≥ 0, i = 1.
repeat
RunAlgorithm Coordinate Descent with input (λ,α) and output
(h,α,Ψ).
Update multipliers, λ := max (λ+ dih, 0)
Update index i := i+ 1.
until stopping criterion is met.
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Output: Ψ





Input: Multipliers λ ≥ 0 and parameters α ≥ 0.
repeat
Update Ψ := argminΨ∈PH L (α,Ψ,λ).
Update α := argminα≥1ǫ L (α,Ψ,λ).
until stopping criterion is met.
Output: (h,α,Ψ), where ht := (αtE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)]− αt) , t ∈ T .




(αt + λt (αtE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)]− αt)) .
Observe that from Proposition 3, we can use dynamic programming to obtain
the optimal policy Ψ that minimizes the Lagrangian for given (α,λ). To
obtain the optimal solutionα that minimizes the Lagrangian for given (λ,Ψ),
we can do so by solving the univariate convex optimization problem,
αt = argmin
{
α + λt (αE [exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/α)]− α)
∣∣∣α ≥ ǫ} ,
via bisection search techniques such as the Golden search methods (Kiefer
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1953). To ensure that the algorithm converges to the optimal policy, we
require a differentiability assumption on the Lagrangian, which is implied in
our next assumption.
Assumption 2. Given α > 0 and λ ≥ 0, the Lagrangian L(α,Ψ,λ) is differ-
entiable with respect to Ψ for all Ψ ∈ PH .
Theorem 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, Algorithm Main returns an optimal
policy that minimizes the CPRI criterion.
Proof. Algorithm Main is a standard subgradient optimization routine
for obtaining the optimal multiplier solution, λ in the nondifferential du-
al function (see for instance, Bertsekas 1999, section 6.3). It calls upon
Algorithm Coordinate Descent to obtain the subgradient h. We first show
for any input λ, the limit point of the sequence {(α(i),Ψ(i))}, which is gen-
erated by Algorithm Coordinate Descent, minimizes L(α,Ψ,λ). We write
f(α,Ψ) = L(α,Ψ,λ) for ease of notation.
We first observe that α(i) is bounded below by 1ǫ and thatΨ(i) is bound-
ed, since we assume that the policy set is bounded. We will next show that








E [exp(−c˜t(Ψ) + τt)]− 1
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E [exp(−c˜t(Ψ) + τt)]− 1
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where c¯t = supΨ∈PH inf{v | P(c˜t(Ψ) − τt ≤ v) = 1} represents the maximal
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consumption premium in period t. Let us assume ǫ ∈ (0, 1). For a given
feasible policy Ψ ∈ PH , suppose α ≥ 1ǫ such that αt > αˆt for some t ∈
T . We will show that α is not the optimal solution that minimizes the
Lagrangian for given (λ,Ψ). Indeed, we have:
αt + λt (αt exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)− αt)
≥ αt (1 + λt exp (−c¯t/αt)− λt) = υt.
(3.9)
If λt ≤ 0.5, then υt ≥ 0.5αt. If λt > 0.5 and c¯t ≤ 0, then υt ≥ αt(1+λt−λt) =
αt. Finally, if λt > 0.5 and c¯t > 0, then −c¯t/αt ≥ −c¯t/αˆt ≥ ln ((λt − 0.5)/λt)
and υt ≥ αt(1 + λt × (λt − 0.5)/λt − λt) = 0.5αt. We have:
αt + λt (αt exp (−(c˜t(Ψ)− τt)/αt)− αt)
≥ 0.5αt > 0.5αˆt ≥ 1 + λt
(
supΨ∈PH E [exp(−c˜t(Ψ) + τt)]− 1
)
.
Therefore, we can lower the value of the Lagrangian, L (α,Ψ,λ) by changing
αt to 1 and hence, α
(i+1) must be bounded above by max{1, αˆ}. Since,
(α(i),Ψ(i)) is a bounded sequence and there must exist at least one limit
point.
Let (α¯, Ψ¯) be a limit point of the sequence {(α(i),Ψ(i))}. Algorithm
Coordinate Descent ensures that the following inequalities holds:
f(α(i),Ψ(i)) ≥ f(α(i),Ψ(i+1)) ≥ f(α(i+1),Ψ(i+1)), (3.10)
for all i. Therefore, since (α(i),Ψ(i)) is bounded, which implies f(α(i),Ψ(i)) >
−∞, the sequence {f(α(i),Ψ(i))} is nonincreasing and converges to the lim-
3. Managing Operational and Financing Decisions to Meet Consumption Targets 72
it point, f(α¯, Ψ¯). It remains to prove that (α¯, Ψ¯) minimizes f , which we
will show by contradiction. Let {(α(ij),Ψ(ij)) | j = 0, 1, · · · } be a sub-
sequence of {(α(i),Ψ(i))} that converges to (α¯, Ψ¯). Suppose there exist-
s Ψo ∈ PH such that ∆ = f(α¯, Ψ¯) − f(α¯,Ψ
o) > 0. Under Assump-
tion 1, the function f(α,Ψ) is differentiable with respect to α > 0 and
Ψ ∈ PH . Since continuity is implied by differentiability, we can find δ > 0
such that |f(α,Ψo) − f(α¯,Ψo)| < ∆/2 for all α with ‖α − α¯‖ ≤ δ. S-
ince {α(ij)} converges to α¯, we can find M1 such that for all j > M1,
||α(ij) − α¯|| ≤ δ and therefore |f(α(ij),Ψo) − f(α¯,Ψo)| < ∆/2. More-
over, since {f(α(ij),Ψ(ij+1))} converges to f(α¯, Ψ¯), there exists M2 such
that for all j > M2, |f(α
(ij),Ψ(ij+1)) − f(α¯, Ψ¯)| < ∆/2. Therefore, for
j > max{M1,M2}, we have:
f(α¯, Ψ¯) < f(α(ij),Ψ(ij+1)) + ∆/2 ≤ f(α(ij),Ψo) + ∆/2 < f(α¯,Ψo) + ∆,
which contradicts the assumption that f(α¯, Ψ¯) = f(α¯,Ψo) + ∆. Hence,
we conclude that f(α¯, Ψ¯) ≤ f(α¯,Ψ), ∀Ψ ∈ PH . Therefore, Ψ¯ minimizes
f(α¯, ·). Under the assumption of differentiability and convexity, the opti-
mality condition is equivalent to ∇Ψf(α¯, Ψ¯)′(Ψ − Ψ¯) ≥ 0 for all Ψ ∈ PH
(see for instance, Bertsekas 1999, Proposition 2.1.2).
Similarly, suppose there exists αo ≥ 1ǫ such that ∆ = f(α¯, Ψ¯) −
f(αo, Ψ¯) > 0. By continuity argument, we can find δ > 0 such that
|f(αo,Ψ) − f(αo, Ψ¯)| < ∆/2 for all Ψ with ‖Ψ − Ψ¯‖ ≤ δ. Since {Ψ(ij)}
converges to Ψ¯, we can findM1 such that for all j > M1, ||Ψ
(ij)−Ψ¯|| ≤ δ and
therefore |f(αo,Ψ(ij)) − f(αo, Ψ¯)| < ∆/2. Moreover, since {f(α(ij),Ψ(ij))}
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converges to f(α¯, Ψ¯), there existsM2 such that for all j > M2, |f(α(ij),Ψ
(ij))−
f(α¯, Ψ¯)| < ∆/2. Therefore, for j > max{M1,M2}, we have:
f(α¯, Ψ¯) < f(α(ij),Ψ(ij)) + ∆/2 ≤ f(αo,Ψ(ij)) + ∆/2 < f(αo, Ψ¯) + ∆,
which contradicts the assumption that f(α¯, Ψ¯) = f(αo, Ψ¯) + ∆. Hence, we
conclude that f(α¯, Ψ¯) ≤ f(α, Ψ¯), ∀α ≥ 1ǫ. Since f(α,Ψ) is differentiable
and convex in α, it implies by the optimality condition that ∇αf(α¯, Ψ¯)′(α−
α¯) ≥ 0 for all α ≥ 1ǫ.





≥ 0, ∀α ≥ 1ǫ,Ψ ∈ PH .
Since f(α,Ψ) is also jointly convex in (α,Ψ), this implies that (α¯, Ψ¯) min-
imizes f(·, ·).
Finally we show that the output of Algorithm Coordinate Descent, h is
indeed a subgradient of g(·) at the input λ. We observe g(·) is a pointwise
minimum of a family of affine functions and hence is concave. Moreover, for
any λo ≥ 0, we have:
g(λo)− g(λ) = min
α≥1ǫ,Ψ∈PH
L(α,Ψ,λo)− L(α¯, Ψ¯,λ)
≤ L(α¯, Ψ¯,λo)− L(α¯, Ψ¯,λ)
= (λo − λ)′ h.
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Therefore, h is a subgradient of g(·) at λ.
3.3 Target-oriented inventory management
In this section, we study the joint inventory-pricing decision problem with
financing control under the target-oriented CPRI decision criterion. The
setup is similar to that in Chen et al. (2007), where a firm needs to determine
the optimal replenishment and pricing policy spanning T periods. At the
beginning of any period t ∈ T , the inventory level xt and the state of wealth
wt are observed. The decision maker then determines the selling price pt ∈
[p
t
, p¯t] and replenishes the inventory to the level yt ≥ xt. The ordering cost,
which consists of unit variable cost qt and fixed ordering cost Kt, will be paid
at the end of the period. The random demand is bounded and affected by
the pricing decision pt such that









t ) are independently distributed nonnegative random vari-
ables satisfying E [z˜t] > 0. The demand is realized near the end of the period
and unsatisfied demand is backlogged. The inventory level is then updated
as xt+1 = yt − dt and the inventory cost ht(xt+1) is tabulated. The cost
function, ht(x) is convex in x, represents holding cost if x ≥ 0 and shortage
cost otherwise. At the end of the planning horizon, hT (x) can be modified
to include salvage values of unsold inventories.
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Similar to Federgruen and Heching (1999), we assume
lim
x→∞
((qt − qt+1/(1 + β))x+ ht(x)) = lim
x→−∞
(qtx+ ht(x)) =∞ t ∈ T ,
with qT+1 = 0 for simplicity. The uncertain income at the end of the period
t ∈ T , is hence given by





1 if x > 0,
0 otherwise.
Similar to the general dynamic decision model discussed in Section 3.2,
once the income rt is realized, the firm determines the financing level bt ∈
Ft(xt+1, wt) in period t ∈ T − to fulfill the desired level of consumption ct and
the state of wealth wt+1 is updated accordingly. At any point in time, we
define the asset value as the total wealth including the value of inventories
on hand. Specifically, at the beginning of period t ∈ T , the asset value is
at = wt + qtxt/(1 + β) and near the end of the period just after the demand
is resolved and before the financing decision if t ∈ T −, the asset value is
a¯t = (1 + β)wt + qt+1xt+1/(1 + β). Note here we apply a discount factor to
the inventory value because the unit variable cost qt is taken at the end of
the period.
Before presenting our results under the CPRI criterion, we first summa-
rize in Table 3.2 the replenishment policies under various decision criteria
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based on risk sensitive additive utility functions. Under the umbrella of risk
neutral models, in the absence of pricing decision, i.e., p¯t = pt, Scarf (1959)
establishes the well-known optimality of (s, S) inventory policy in the pres-
ence of fixed ordering cost. The inventory replenishment strategy in period
t is characterized by two parameters (st, St) such that if the inventory lev-
el xt is below st, an order of size St − xt is made. Otherwise, no order is
placed. A special case of this policy is the base-stock policy, in which st = St
is the base-stock level, which is optimal when Kt = 0. If pricing decision is
available, Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004) show that (s, S, A, p) joint inventory-
pricing policy is optimal. The inventory strategy in period t is characterized
by two parameters (st, St) and a set At ⊆ [st, (st + St)/2], which can be
empty depending on the problem instance. Whenever xt < st or xt ∈ At,
an order of size St − xt is placed. Otherwise, no order is placed. The price
depends on the initial inventory level at the beginning of the period. Taking
into account of decision maker’s risk aversion, Chen et al. (2007) show that
under full financing, the optimal policy under an additive-exponential utility
has the same structure as the classical risk neutral counterpart. Chen et al.
(2007) also present the structural results for general additive concave utility
function and under full financing and Kt = 0. They show that the optimal
policy is one of base-stock in which the base-stock level depends solely on
the asset value at at the beginning of period t ∈ T .
We now present our results for the joint inventory-pricing control prob-
lem under the CPRI criterion.
Theorem 9. Under full financing, the optimal policies of the joint inventory-
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Tab. 3.2: Summary of results under additive utility decision criteria.
Price Not a Decision Price is a Decision
Kt = 0 Kt > 0 Kt = 0 Kt > 0
Risk-neutral model Base-stock (s, S)
Base-stock
(s, S, A, p)
list price
Exponential utility
Base-stock (s, S) Base-stock (s, S, A, p)
under full financing




under full financing base-stock base-stock
pricing control problem under the CPRI criterion are as follows:
1. A base stock policy is optimal without fixed ordering cost.
2. An (s, S) policy is optimal in the absence of pricing control.
3. An (s, S, A, p) policy is optimal in the general case when pricing decision
is allowed and the fixed ordering cost is positive.
Proof. We have established in Theorem 6 that the optimal policies of the
inventory-pricing decision problems correspond to those that maximize an
expected exponential utility of the total incomes. The structural results of
these policies are derived by Chen et al. (2007).
Unfortunately, structural results under constrained financing are limited
and so we restrict ourselves to the case when where is no fixed ordering
cost, which belongs to the class of convex dynamic decision problems. We
consider a special type of financing restriction, which we call asset constrained
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financing where borrowing above the asset value is prohibited, that is,
Ft(xt+1, wt) = {b |b ≤ (1 + β)wt + qt+1xt+1/(1 + β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=a¯t
} t ∈ T −. (3.11)
Under this restriction, borrowing is limited by the asset value, which com-
prises the wealth and inventory value.
Theorem 10. Under asset constrained financing, asset dependent base-stock
policies are optimal for inventory-pricing decision problems without fixed
cost if the decision criterion is CPRI or an additive-exponential utility. In
other words, the base-stock level, St(at) depends solely on the asset value,
at = wt + qtxt/(1 + β) at the beginning of the period t ∈ T .




(1 + β)aT + lT (yT , pt, z˜T ) t = T
(1 + β)at + lt(yt, pt, z˜t)− at+1 t ∈ T −,
where the function lt : ℜ4 7→ ℜ is defined by:
lt(y, p, z1, z2) = (qt+1/(1 + β)− qt) y+(p− qt+1/(1 + β)) (z1−z2p)−ht(y−z1+z2p) t ∈ T ,
and it is obvious that lt(y, p, z1, z2) is jointly concave in y and p for any
z2 ≥ 0.
Given the state (xt, at) at the beginning of period t ∈ T , let Vt(xt, at)
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be the maximal value of E[
∑T
i=t−δi exp(−c˜i/αi)]. We have
VT (xT , aT ) = max
yT≥xT










Since z˜2T is always nonnegative, lT (y, p, z˜T ) is concave in (y, p) for all realiza-
tions. Therefore, the objective function in the above equation is concave in
(yT , pT , aT ). Hence, as shown in Chen et al. (2007), Proposition 4, VT (xT , aT )
is concave in (xT , aT ), and is nondecreasing in aT . Moreover, since


















the assumption on hT implies that there exists a finite constant ST ∈ ℜ such
that the optimal order-up-to level is y∗T = max{xT , ST}.
Assume for some t + 1 ∈ T , Vt+1(xt+1, at+1) is concave in (xt+1, at+1)
and nondecreasing in at+1. Given all information before the decision bt and
under asset constrained financing, the financing constraint bt ∈ Ft(xt+1, wt)
can be represented by at+1 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have



















where µt : ℜ 7→ ℜ is defined by:
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Since µt is concave and nondecreasing, and lt(yt, pt, z) is concave in (yt, pt)
for all z2t ≥ 0, we know that µt ((1 + β)at + lt(yt, pt, zt)− at+1) is concave
in (yt, pt, at, at+1) for all z
2
t ≥ 0 and is nondecreasing in at. Further, s-
ince Vt+1(·, ·) is concave, it implies Vt+1 (yt − z1t + z
2
t pt, at+1) is concave in














is concave in (yt, pt, at) and nondecreasing in at . Therefore, by the consump-
tion on ht, there exists finite St ∈ ℜ, which depends on at but is independent
from xt, such that the optimal order-up-to level is y
∗
t = max{xt, St}. More-
over, from Proposition 4 in Chen et al. (2007), Vt(xt, at) is concave in (xt, at),
and it is obviously nondecreasing in at.
By induction, we know for all t ∈ T , Vt(xt, at) is concave in (xt, at) and
nondecreasing in at, and there exists an optimal St, which is independent
from xt but may depends on at, such that the optimal order up to level is
y∗t = max{xt, St}. Hence, an asset dependent base-stock policy is optimal to
the additive-exponential utility criterion.
The result under the CPRI criterion follows from Theorem 7. With
K = 0, the consumptions can be verified to be convex in the general history
dependent policy. Therefore, Theorem 7 shows that the optimal policy can
be solved by maximizing an expected additive-exponential utility, and hence
the optimal policies are asset dependent base-stock policy.
We summarize our results in Table 3.3.
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Tab. 3.3: Summary of new contributions.
Price Not a Decision Price is a Decision
Kt = 0 Kt > 0 Kt = 0 Kt > 0
CPRI under
Base stock (s, S) Base stock (s, S, A, p)
full financing




constrained financing base-stock base-stock
Exponential utility
? ?under asset Asset dependent Asset dependent
constrained financing base-stock base-stock
3.4 Computational study
In this section, we present a numerical study on an inventory control problem
without pricing decisions. We consider a stylized five period problem, T = 5
and there is no fixed ordering cost, Kt = 0. The inventory cost functions are
ht(x) = h
+
t max{x, 0}+ h
−
t max{−x, 0} t ∈ T ,
where h+t represents the unit inventory holding cost and h
−
t is the unit short-
age cost. The values of the input parameters are presented in Table 3.4.
We assume discrete demands uniformly distributed in [0, 100] and indepen-
dent across periods. The system starts with x1 = w1 = 0, and we assume
unrestricted financing and zero interest rate.
With the above setting, we compare the consumptions profiles generated
by the CPRI model against the risk neutral and additive-exponential utility
models. In our computational studies, we first obtain the optimal inventory
policies under various decision criteria. The optimal policy for the additive-
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Tab. 3.4: Input parameters of the inventory model.
unit ordering cost qt = 3, t ∈ T
selling price pt = 10, t ∈ T
unit holding cost h+t = 1, t ∈ T
unit penalty cost h−t = 6, t ∈ T
exponential utility model is solved using the dynamic programming recursion
described in Chen et al. (2007). Next, we use Monte Carlo simulations with
100, 000 independent trails to estimate the consumptions profiles. In Figure
3.1, we present the risky profile of the cash flows generated by the inventory
system under the optimal risk neutral policy in the absence of financing. It
is not surprising that the cash flows have large variability.














































Fig. 3.1: Cash flows profile under optimal risk neutral policy.
3. Managing Operational and Financing Decisions to Meet Consumption Targets 83
3.4.1 CPRI versus Risk Neutral Model
In the first study, we compare the results between the CPRI model and the
risk neutral model. For the CPRI model, we assume consumption targets
in periods t ∈ T − are zeros and we vary only the last period target, τT .
Under an optimal FAT policy, consumptions will only appear in the last
period. For the risk neutral model, whose objective function is indifferent to
any financing decisions, we assume all operational cash flows in t ∈ T − are
saved and are used to finance consumption at the last period. Hence, in both
experiments, it suffices to compare the consumptions at the final period.
To provide a fair comparison, we apply seven performance measures.
The first two are expectation and standard deviation of the final consump-
tions. The third is the probability that the final consumptions will achieve
the given target, and we call it attainment probability (AP). The fourth is
expected loss (EL) relative to the target, and by normalizing it with the
probability of loss we get the conditional expected loss (CEL) as the fifth
measure. Finally, we consider the value at risk (VaR), i.e., the threshold
loss that the loss with respect to the target does not exceed with a specific
probability, at 95% and 99%. While the first three measures are intuitive,
the last four measures are also widely adopted in financial risk management
(Embrechts et al. 1997, Jorion 2006).
Table 3.5 shows the performance from the risk neutral model against the
CPRI model. Observe that while yielding the consumptions profile with lower
risk, the CPRI model only reduces the expectation with a relatively small
fraction. In particular, with τT = 900, the standard deviation is reduced by
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consumptions deviation @ 95% @ 99%
1200
Risk Neutral 1254.98 56.0% 419.46 143.54 326.54 653.05 943.64
CPRI 1253.25 56.2% 406.18 139.09 317.33 634.80 921.61
1150
Risk Neutral 1254.98 60.5% 419.46 122.68 310.92 603.05 893.64
CPRI 1247.71 60.8% 391.35 114.86 292.62 567.92 845.34
1100
Risk Neutral 1254.98 64.8% 419.46 104.02 295.55 553.05 843.64
CPRI 1237.99 65.0% 375.04 93.82 268.40 502.90 772.24
1050
Risk Neutral 1254.98 68.9% 419.46 87.46 281.05 503.05 793.64
CPRI 1222.13 69.1% 355.64 75.65 244.63 438.12 698.26
1000
Risk Neutral 1254.98 72.8% 419.46 72.89 268.07 453.05 743.64
CPRI 1202.59 73.0% 336.54 60.37 223.29 377.22 627.94
950
Risk Neutral 1254.98 76.4% 419.46 60.21 255.59 403.05 693.64
CPRI 1175.99 76.4% 315.18 47.68 202.41 319.00 559.31
900
Risk Neutral 1254.98 79.8% 419.46 49.27 243.71 353.05 643.64
CPRI 1143.52 79.7% 292.41 37.20 183.00 264.77 491.63
AP=Attainment probability; EL=Expected Loss;
CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
30% and the mean loss, conditional mean loss, VaR @ 95%, and VaR @99%
are all reduced by nearly 25%. And the only sacrifice is a 9% reduction in the
expectation. The attainment probabilities from these two models are almost
identical. Moreover, we can see from Table 3.5 that as the targets increase,
the difference between the two models becomes less significant. The reason
is that with high targets, the CPRI model is less risk averse and hence the
result is similar to the risk neutral model.
3.4.2 CPRI versus Additive-Exponential Utility Model
We next compare the CPRI model against the additive-exponential utility





α > 0. For the CPRI model, we apply the same consumption targets, τt = τ
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for all t ∈ T . In Figure 3.2, we present the consumptions profiles under
the additive-exponential utility model as we vary α ∈ {10, 100, 400}. In
contrast, we show in Figure 3.3 the consumptions profiles under the CPRI
model as we vary τ ∈ {100, 150, 200}. We can see that while the additive
exponential utility model yields uncertain consumptions in each period, the
CPRI model yield deterministic consumption in the first four periods and
relegate uncertainty in consumption to the last target.
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Fig. 3.2: Consumptions profiles under the additive-exponential utility model as α
varies.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a target-oriented decision model to help decision
makers regulate their consumptions profile over time using some prescribed
consumption targets. The model captures both the decision makers’ risk
aversion toward uncertain cash flow and their sensitive to the timing of the
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Fig. 3.3: Consumptions profiles under the CPRI model as τ varies.
resolution of uncertainties. By taking into account of the prescribed targets,
the model highlights managers’ practical concern in planning corporate ac-
tivities: not only they need to meet everyday corporate consumptions such as
sending out pay checks to employees, they are also typically concerned about
whether they can achieve a target profit level at the end of the planning
horizon.
With the CPRI criterion, we show that under full financing a FAT pol-
icy is optimal and accordingly, we can obtain the optimal operational policy
by solving a modest number of dynamic programming problems. When fi-
nancing is restricted, we show that for convex dynamic decision problems,
the optimal policies correspond to those that maximize expected additive-
exponential utilities. We also provide an algorithm to find the optimal poli-
cies.
Applying the CPRI criterion to the joint inventory-pricing decision prob-
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lem, we identify the optimal inventory and pricing policies for the case with
fixed ordering cost under full financing, and the policy structures for the case
of zero fixed ordering cost under restricted financing. We also provide the
policy structures when the objective function is additive-exponential utility
and the fixed cost is zero. Finally, our numerical studies suggest that our
target-oriented dynamic decisions model provides an interesting alternative
for regulating consummations over time.
4. MANAGING UNDERPERFORMANCE RISK IN
PROJECT PORTFOLIO SELECTION
In numerous organizations that own and manage projects, a problem of cen-
tral importance is selecting which of the organization’s available projects to
accept and run. This decision is typically made either by a Project Manage-
ment Office, or by a senior manager with experience as a project manager.
Both statistical and anecdotal evidence suggest that doing the right projects
is a big factor in doing projects right (Cooper et al. 2000). Indeed, well
chosen projects are typically relatively easy to manage. Whereas, poorly s-
elected projects are often dysfunctional and may compromise other projects
by absorbing their resources.
Decisions to accept or reject projects can be made one project at a time,
i.e. sequentially (Lochan 2010). In many organizations, available projects are
initially screened according to various criteria such as their payback period
and risk characteristics. Then, those projects that pass the initial screening
are subjected to a more detailed evaluation that may include, for example,
net present value and internal rate of return calculations. However, a project
portfolio approach that simultaneously makes accept or reject decisions for all
the available projects offers several important advantages over sequential se-
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lection (Kooragamage 2010). First, it more accurately models overall project
portfolio issues, such as risk. Second, it more effectively utilizes the available
resources. Third, it enables the modeling of correlation between uncertain
project returns. Fourth, where there are interaction effects such as synergies
between the projects, they can also be modeled effectively using the project
portfolio approach. Finally, subject to the accuracy of available data, the
project portfolio approach enables optimization of an overall objective for
project selection.
A widely used approach for project selection is application of the de-
terministic zero one knapsack problem (Kellerer et al. 2004) and its exten-
sions. An overview of project selection using such approaches is provided by
Weber et al. (1990). Generalizations of the knapsack model (Fox et al. 1984,
Dickinson et al. 2001) consider interaction effects that are limited to those
arising from synergistic returns between pairs of projects. Keisler (2005)
identifies synergies among larger groups of projects.
However, in many practical project selection problems, the applicabil-
ity of deterministic optimization models is compromised by a high level of
uncertainty in the return from each project at the time it is selected. A
study of 1,015 projects by Pohl and Mihaljek (1992) documents this. Un-
certainty in the return from a project may be classified into two main cate-
gories; uncertainty regarding its technical success, and uncertainty regarding
its commercial success (MacMillan and McGrath 2002). The main sources
of technical uncertainty include outcomes in research and development (e.g.,
for new products), in prototype testing (e.g., for safety testing of automo-
biles), and in regulatory approval (e.g., for new pharmaceutical products).
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The main sources of commercial uncertainty include randomness in time to
market (e.g., for seasonal products such as fashion items and toys), in the
introduction of competitors’ products (e.g., for consumer electronics), and
in general economic factors (e.g., a recession). Hence, there is a need for a
project portfolio methodology that achieves robust performance under un-
certain project returns.
Keynes (1921), Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) discuss the distinc-
tion between risk where probability distributions are known, and ambiguity
where they are not. Because of the nonrecurring characteristics of projects
(Newell et al. 2006), probability distributions for returns may not be known.
For the project selection problem, classical robust optimization can be ap-
plied to maximize the worst case total return, when the returns of projects are
described by an uncertainty set without distributional information (Soyster
1973, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 1998). Kouvelis and Yu (1996) consider sim-
ilar uncertainty sets, which can be represented by a convex hull of scenarios.
However, neither approach considers the decision maker’s ambiguity prefer-
ence, and both are often viewed as overconservative. Moreover, the resulting
models are typically highly intractable.
Bertsimas and Sim (2004) introduce an adjustable polyhedral uncertain-
ty set where the decision maker can specify an ambiguity preference by defin-
ing a “budget of uncertainty”. This approach avoids overconservatism and
preserves the solvability of many underlying optimization models. However,
it is sensitive to the budget of uncertainty parameter, which is apparently
hard for many decision makers to estimate. Given the partially characterized
distributions we consider, it is both possible and beneficial to avoid specifying
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this parameter.
In this chapter, we assume that exact probability distributions are not
known. We consider the project selection problem under partially character-
ized distributions, or distributional ambiguity, about project returns. As in
practice, these decisions are made subject to a budget and other constraints,
such as portfolio diversification constraints and logical constraints between
the projects (Beaujon et al. 2001, Loch et al. 2001). Our problem definition
allows for correlation between the returns of different projects, which oc-
curs naturally where projects use the same resources or are subject to the
same external challenges. We also allow for interaction effects, for example
synergies, between the returns of selected projects.
Our selection criterion is related to the concept of target based choice
(Simon 1955), which argues that the main goal of most firms is not max-
imizing return but rather attaining a target return. Several descriptive s-
tudies of the risk behaviors of real world managers (Lanzillotti 1958, Mao
1970, Payne et al. 1980, 1981) confirm that aspiration levels drive decision
making. In the same spirit, we allow the decision maker to stipulate a
desired aspiration level or target return. Extending the riskiness index of
Aumann and Serrano (2008), we propose the underperformance riskiness in-
dex for evaluating project portfolios. This index is the reciprocal of the ab-
solute risk aversion (ARA) of an ambiguity averse individual with constant
ARA who is indifferent between the target return with certainty and the un-
certain portfolio return. Our model identifies the least risky project portfolio
that meets the target. Our methodology for minimizing underperformance
risk in project selection uses binary search on the ARA until indifference
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is achieved. At each value of the ARA, we apply a Benders decomposition
method (Benders 1962) to solve the subproblem.
We compare our model with several classical approaches, both theoret-
ically and computationally. We first identify several necessary properties for
an appropriate approach to select projects. Based on those properties, we
compare our model with traditional ones and identify its relative benefits.
Our computational results show that our model finds more robust project
portfolios than other approaches that are defined as benchmarks. Moreover,
the model performs competitively with the classical approaches, even when
measured by the various criteria that are optimized by those approaches. We
also provide a simpler decision support tool for managers, in the form of a
greedy heuristic, for use at the subproblem. This heuristic is shown compu-
tationally to identify project portfolios with near optimal underperformance
risk. Finally, we discuss the implementability of our results for management
decisions.
We briefly summarize our contributions to the literature, as follows.
1. We formally model interactions and correlations among project returns,
which are distinct and important issues in the project selection prob-
lem. We introduce the concept of a “project bundle” to formulate the
project interactions, and suggest a linear factor-based model to address
the correlation issue.
2. We describe uncertainties using a two-stage process. The first stage
uses Kullback-Leibler divergence to specify the probability of each pos-
sible scenario for the uncertain factor, and the second stage charac-
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terizes each uncertain scenario using descriptive statistics such as the
mean and bounds.
3. By adopting the underperformance riskiness index, we take into account
the effect of target return, which is an important factor in real decision
making but rarely considered in the literature.
4. Our computational studies show that the project selections found by
minimizing the underperformance risk are more than competitive in
achieving the target with those found by several classical benchmark
approaches, and more robust in performance.
5. We provide a Benders decomposition algorithm to derive exact solution-
s, and a greedy heuristic with which managers can obtain a suboptimal
solution. Our computational studies show that the greedy heuristic
provides close to exact solutions.
Structure of the chapter. Section 4.1 defines the problem, describes
the uncertainty and interaction structure, and presents our model. Sec-
tion 4.2 contains a discussion of the solvability of various special cases of
the problem. Section 4.3 describes an overall solution procedure. Section 4.4
describes a simple heuristic for solving the subproblem of the project selec-
tion model. In Section 4.5, we compare the performance of the solutions from
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 against the benchmarks. Finally, Section 4.6 provides
a conclusion, comments about implementability issues, and suggestions for
future research.
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4.1 Model Formulation
In Section 4.1.1, we provide our notation and define the project selection
problem. Section 4.1.2 describes the modeling of interaction effects and un-
certainty. Section 4.1.3 describes how we model distributional ambiguity.
Section 4.1.4 describes our criterion for evaluating underperformance risk.
4.1.1 Notation and problem definition
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of available projects. All projects are initially
available. We use r˜j denotes the uncertain return of project j. Each project
is either selected in full, or rejected. Let yj = 1 if project j is selected, and
yj = 0 otherwise. We use boldface notation for matrices and vectors, e.g.
y = (y1, . . . , yn).
We denote the total uncertain return of the selected projects by π˜(y).
The problem faced by the decision maker is
max π˜(y) (4.1)
s.t. Ay ≤ b (4.2)
y ∈ {0, 1}n. (4.3)
Objective (4.1) maximizes the total uncertain return (indeed we can not
maximize this objective since there is uncertainty, a decision criterion is in
need to map the random profit to a real value which can be maximized; we
will discuss on the decision criterion later). Constraints (4.2) require that the
selection of projects meets various deterministic restrictions discussed above,
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whereA is a constraint matrix and b is a vector of resources. Constraint (4.3)
ensures that each project is either accepted in full, or rejected. We let Y =
{y : Ay ≤ b, y ∈ {0, 1}n}. If there are no interactions between the returns
of projects, then the total uncertain return of the selected projects is π˜(y) =∑n
j=1 r˜jyj. The next section generalizes this condition.
4.1.2 Interactions, uncertainty and correlation
Interactions among projects are common in practice. When several projects
are implemented together, the total return can be greater or smaller than
the sum of those projects’ individual returns. For example, the implemen-
tation of two IT projects may create additional value through integration
(Cho 2010). Yet, in the project selection literature, few papers consider this
phenomenon. This is apparently due to the complexity which is introduced
by modeling it. One approach (Fox et al. 1984) is to use the cross product of
the binary decision variables. However, this formulation defines a nonlinear
combinatorial optimization problem, and cannot clearly elicit the returns for
interactions among more than two projects.
We consider interactions among the uncertain returns of a subset of
projects with any cardinality. We define a project bundle β ⊆ N to consist
of any number of projects that may have an interaction effect. By project
screening, the manager can identify all project bundles. We define the project
bundle set, E , as follows.
Definition 9. The project bundle set, E is the minimal set with the following
properties:
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1. {i} ∈ E , for i ∈ N .
2. For β1, β2 ∈ E , if β1 ∩ β2 6= ∅, then β1 ∪ β2 ∈ E .
The first property establishes consistency with the simple case without
interaction effects. The second property shows that, for any two nondisjoint
project bundles in E , their union is a project bundle in E . Hence, its return
is well defined. This definition of project bundles generalizes earlier studies
(Fox et al. 1984, Dickinson et al. 2001) by considering interactions among
more than two projects.
We use an example to illustrate the project bundle set E . Consider three
available projects, N = {1, 2, 3}. There is a synergistic effect when projects
1 and 2 are both selected, and when projects 2 and 3 are both selected.
Therefore, {1, 2} and {2, 3} are project bundles in E . According to Property
2 of Definition 9, {1, 2, 3} is also an element in E . Hence, the project bundle
set E =
{
{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
}
.





where r˜β represents the uncertain return from selecting β, and Γ(β,y) is an




1 , if yj = 1, for j ∈ β; 6 ∃β ′ ∈ E , β ′ ⊃ β such that yj = 1, for j ∈ β ′;
0 , otherwise.
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Thus, if Γ(β,y) = 1, project bundle β is a maximal subset of N under
selection y. In general, it is unrealistic for managers to identify interaction
effects among all subsets of projects. Instead, they typically focus on a small
number of significant interactions. Hence, |E| is not exponentially large in
practice. Keisler (2005) describes the process used by project managers to
estimate r˜β.
Consistent with the above discussion of the sources of uncertainty, we
assume that the uncertain return of each project bundle is an affine function







where the factor coefficients r0β, . . . , r
K
β are known. Here we describe the
correlation effect using a factor-based model instead of the typical covariance
matrix. Our reasons are (a) estimating the covariance matrix from real data
is difficult in general, especially for new or unique projects, (b) the linear
factor-based model is motivated by practice since the performance of different
project bundles depends on common factors in many cases, and (c) the linear-
factor based model preserves the linear model structure and hence reduces
the complexity of the solution process. In situations where historical data
for similar projects is available, various statistical tools such as principal
component analysis and linear regression can be used to calibrate the factors
from the data. Even for a unique project, the factor-based model makes
estimating the returns easier.
We denote by V the set of all attainable project returns, r˜ : Ω→ ℜ, as





∣∣∣ ∃(v0, v) ∈ ℜK+1 : v˜(ω) = v0 + K∑
k=1
vkz˜k(ω), ω ∈ Ω
}
.
The returns of two selected projects are correlated if they have one or
more factors with nonzero factor coefficients in common. The total uncertain















4.1.3 Modeling risk and ambiguity
Since projects are typically unique (Project Management Institute 2004),
there is a lack of historical information to elicit the actual distributions of
their returns. Even with the availability of historical records, it is not always
possible to determine exact distributions. The 2008 financial crisis provides
many examples. Therefore, we do not assume knowledge of the exact prob-
ability distribution on F . Instead, we permit ambiguity and assume that
the true distribution, P, lies in a family of distributions denoted by F. The
modeling of uncertainty in probability distributions is now well established
in robust optimization; we refer interested readers to Ben-Tal et al. (2013)
for recent developments. Our model for distributional ambiguity is motivat-
ed by scenario building, which is commonly used in practice for analyzing
project payoffs (Hoffman 1985). Instead of specifying the exact probability
and payoff associated with each scenario, which are often determined subjec-
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tively, we propose an ambiguity model over these parameters. For notational
convenience, we temporarily suppress the subscript k in the uncertain factor
z˜k. Each uncertain factor z˜ can be decomposed into J mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive scenarios, such that in the jth scenario, z˜ takes
the value of ζ˜j with probability pj , where ζ˜j is uncertain. For example, z˜
can take value ζ˜1 if the economic condition is good, with probability p1; and
it will take value ζ˜2 if the economic condition is weak. The set of possible
vectors p = (p1, . . . , pJ) is denoted by P ⊆ {p
∣∣ p′1 = 1,p ≥ 0}.
Given the jth scenario, we assume that the probability distribution of
ζ˜j lies in some family of distributions Fj. Further, we assume that Fj is























∣∣∣ Pj (ζ˜j ∈ [ζj , ζ¯j]) = 1,EPj (ζ˜j) ∈ [µj, µ¯j]} . (4.4)
The family of distributions on z˜ is therefore characterized by P,F1, . . . ,FJ .
This two-stage approach for modeling distributional ambiguity general-
izes the conventional scenario approach where the probabilities and payoffs
are precisely given. This approach elicits the probability and other details of
each uncertain scenario, and hence provides project managers with a decision
support tool to analyze uncertain factors further and extract more accurate
information. Next, we specify the objective function of the project selection
problem for evaluating the preference of project portfolio returns, π˜(y), under
this model of uncertainty. We need to optimize over a possibly exponential
number of feasible project portfolio returns, whose feasible space is not neces-
4. Managing Underperformance Risk in Project Portfolio Selection 100
sarily convex. Ideally, the objective function should be computable in polyno-
mial time. Unfortunately, even in the absence of ambiguity, determining the
distributions of π˜(y), which involves the evaluation of a weighted sum of inde-
pendently distributed random factors, is a computationally intractable prob-
lem (Khachiyan 1989, Nemirovski and Shapiro 2006). Moreover, the problem
may be exacerbated by the presence of distributional ambiguity, where the
evaluation of the objective function may require optimization over the family
of distributions. Our computability requirement disqualifies many common
criteria found in decision theory, including expected utility under general
utility functions, and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992). Similar concerns disqualify many coherent and convex risk measures
(Artzner et al. 1999, Fo¨llmer et al. 2004) from mathematical finance, includ-
ing conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) and
the optimized certainty equivalent (OCE) of Ben-Tal and Teboulle (2007).
Worst-case expected return is appealing due to its intuitiveness and tractabil-
ity; however, while it considers ambiguity aversion, it ignores risk aversion.
We refer interested readers to Knight (1921) and Hsu et al. (2005) for the
distinction between risk and ambiguity. Mean-variance approaches, includ-
ing Markowitz’s (1959) and Roy’s (1952) safety first, are computable but
contradict the principle of monotonicity. That is, a portfolio with returns
that outperform those in another portfolio in all scenarios may be ranked
inferiorly. Hence, these approaches are also unsuitable.
The only utility function that we can tractably evaluate under our pro-
posed model of uncertainty is the exponential utility function, which assumes
that the decision maker has constant ARA and corresponds to a convex risk
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measure known as the entropic risk measure (Fo¨llmer et al. 2004). However,
a problem with this approach is how to elicit the ARA parameter from the
decision maker, since it may be difficult to specify objectively. Moreover, be-
havioral paradoxes such as those of Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961), suggest
the weakness of the expected utility paradigm in capturing human preference
under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In the next section, we
present a closely related approach that resolves these issues.
4.1.4 Underperformance riskiness index
Aumann and Serrano (2008) propose an economic index of riskiness for eval-
uating a risky position, which is defined by the reciprocal of the ARA of an in-
dividual with constant ARA who is indifferent between taking and not taking
the position. Incidentally, the riskiness index also falls within the framework
of quasiconcave satisficing measures of Brown and Sim (2009) and accept-
ability indices of Cherny and Madan (2009). The index has useful attributes
for risk management, including being positively homogenous and subaddi-
tive (Artzner et al. 1999, Fo¨llmer et al. 2004). Moreover, Brown et al. (2012)
show that this approach resolves important behavioral paradoxes.
Definition 10. Given a target, τ ∈ ℜ, the underperformance riskiness index
(URI), ρτ : V → [0,∞] is defined by




∣∣∣∣ Cα(v˜) ≥ τ, α > 0
}
,
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We use the convention inf∅(·) =∞.
The function Cα(v˜) is the certainty equivalent of the uncertain return
v˜ under the worst case exponential utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
with ARA parameter α. It has the following property.























































where both inequalities follow from Jensen’s inequality. Hence, to establish
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the equality (4.5), it suffices to show that limα↓0 Cα(v˜) is bounded below by
infP∈F EP(v˜). Observe that v˜ ∈ V is bounded, since it depends affinely on a
finite set of bounded uncertain factors. Hence, there exists a v > 0 such that
|v˜(ω)| ≤ v for all ω ∈ Ω. Indeed, for P ∈ F and α > 0,














= 1− EP(v˜)α + exp(vα)− 1− vα
= exp(vα)− (v + EP(v˜))α
≤ exp(vα)− (v + µ)α,
























exp(vα)v − (v + µ)
exp(vα)− (v + µ)α
)
= µ,
where the second equality follows from L’Hoˆpital’s rule.
The URI is the reciprocal of the highest ARA for which the target,
τ , equals the certainty equivalent of v˜ under ambiguity aversion. The URI
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describes how risky v˜ is with respect to the target τ . In specifying the target
τ , we assume that there exists a feasible project selection y ∈ Y such that the
expected return of the projects under ambiguity aversion exceeds the target,
i.e. infP∈F EP (π˜ (y)) ≥ τ . If v˜ always achieves the target, i.e. v˜(ω) ≥ τ for
all ω ∈ Ω, then Cα(v˜) ≥ τ for all α > 0; hence, ρτ (v˜) = 0, reflecting that the
underperformance risk is zero. If v˜ never achieves the target, then Cα(v˜) < τ
for α > 0; hence, ρτ (v˜) =∞.
In the case of known distributions, Brown et al. (2012) show that the
URI model is consistent with second order stochastic dominance, and can al-
so resolve several behavioral paradoxes that cannot be explained by expected
utility preferences. In the case with distributional ambiguity, the worst case
exponential utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) can lead to con-
servative preferences that may strictly favor low probability rewards over
ambiguity. Consider the following example:
• Project 1: Payoffs of $100, 000 w.p 0.01 and $0 w.p 0.99,
• Project 2: Payoffs of either $100, 000 or $0 with unknown probability.
Project 1 has a low probability of succeeding, while Project 2 has an unknown
probability of succeeding. Due to the low success likelihood of Project 1,
it is conceivable that Project 2 might be preferred in practice. Howev-
er, under worst case utility preference, Project 1 is strictly preferred over
Project 2. On the other hand, URI evaluates both projects as equally bad
(URI = ∞), unless τ falls below $1, 000 in which case Project 1 is strictly
preferred. In Brown et al. (2012), the URI model can be extended to encom-
pass risk/ambiguity seeking behavior, so that Project 2 is strictly preferred if
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τ exceeds $1000. However, we do not consider this extension because we as-
sume that investors are prudent and do not set targets that are unachievable
in expectation.
We next present two characteristics of URI that are important in the
context of risk management.
Proposition 5. For any risky positions, v˜1, v˜2 ∈ V and corresponding targets,
τ1, τ2 ∈ ℜ,
ρλτ1(λv˜1) = λρτ1(v˜1), for all λ ≥ 0;
ρτ1+τ2(v˜1 + v˜2) ≤ ρτ1(v˜1) + ρτ2(v˜2).














































≥ τ1, α > 0
}
= λρτ1(v˜1).
Let ρ1 = ρτ1(v˜1) and ρ2 = ρτ2(v˜2). The result is trivially true if either ρ1
or ρ2 is infinite. Suppose not, then Proposition 4 implies that the following

















≤ 1, for all ǫ2 > 0.














− (1− λ) v˜2−τ2
ρ2+ǫ2
))















where λ = ρ1+ǫ1
ρ1+ρ2+ǫ1+ǫ2
∈ [0, 1]. The first inequality follows from convexity.
Equivalently, we have
C1/(ρ1+ρ2+ǫ)(v˜1 + v˜2) ≥ τ1 + τ2, for all ǫ > 0.
Hence, ρτ1+τ2(v˜1 + v˜2) ≤ ρ1 + ρ2.
Proposition 5 implies that when projects are merged, the collective un-
derperformance risk in meeting the targets is no more than the sum of the
underperformance risks of the individual projects in meeting their own tar-
gets. This result follows typical risk management practice in encouraging
diversification.
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s.t. Cα(π˜(y)) ≥ τ
y ∈ Y .
(4.6)
The first result simplifies Cα(π˜(y)).










where we let z˜0 = 1 for simplicity.



































































To minimize the URI for the project selection problem, we perform bi-
nary search on the ARA parameter, α, to find the maximum value of α
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that satisfies Cα(v˜) ≥ τ , as justified by Proposition 4. We now consider the
subproblem defined by a fixed value of α > 0:
max Cα(π˜(y))
s.t. y ∈ Y .
(4.7)
4.2 Solvability
In this section, we investigate the computational solvability of several cases
of the problem.
Remark 1. In some cases, the structure of the constraint matrix Ay ≤ b
implies intractability, even for a deterministic version of the project selection
problem. For example, under a simple knapsack constraint, the recognition
version of the deterministic problem is binary NP-complete. Further, under
arbitrary resource constraints, the recognition version of the deterministic
problem is unary NP-complete.
We therefore focus on solvability results that derive from the uncertainty
and interaction structure of the problem. Section 4.2.1 identifies a special
case that is as solvable as the deterministic problem. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3
use different assumptions about the uncertainty and interaction structure to
establish negative results for two other special cases.
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4.2.1 Independent returns without interactions
Proposition 6. If there are no interactions among the projects, and their
returns are independent, then the objective function in problem (4.7) is a
linear function of y.
Proof. In the case of no interactions, the project bundle set is the same as
the available project set, i.e., E = N , and for i ∈ N , Γ(i,y) = yi.
For all i ∈ N , let Ii = {k
∣∣ rki 6= 0, k = 1, . . . , K}, i.e., r˜i = r0i +∑
k∈Ii
rki z˜k. Also, since the returns are independent, we have Ii ∩Ij = ∅, for
i, j ∈ N and i 6= j. From Lemma 5,


















































where the last equality holds since yi ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 6 shows that, without interactions and with independen-
t uncertain returns, problem (4.7) retains the solvability of the problem
max
y∈Y
r′y. For example, if the feasible set of y is a uniform matroid, i.e.,
Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n
∣∣ ∑
k∈N yk = m}, then problem (4.7) is optimally solved











, i = 1, . . . , n, in non-
increasing order and selecting the first m projects. Alternatively, if the fea-
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sible set of y is defined by a simple knapsack constraint, i.e., Y = {y ∈
{0, 1}n
∣∣ ∑
k∈N akyk = b}, then problem (4.7) is optimally solved in pseu-
dopolynomial time (Kellerer et al. 2004).
Corollary 3. For the special case where project returns are independent and














s.t. c′y ≤ b,
y ∈ {0, 1}n.
4.2.2 Correlated returns without interactions
We assume the absence of interactions, in order to focus solely on the role of
correlation. Hence, E = N . We have the following result.
Proposition 7. If there are no interactions among the projects, then the recog-
nition version of problem (4.7) with correlated returns under a uniform ma-
troid is binary NP -complete.
Proof. By reduction from the following NP-Complete problem Gary and Johnson
(1979).
Equal Cardinality Partition: Given a finite set N of even cardinality n, with
size ck ∈ Z+ for each k ∈ N , determine if there exists a partition N1,N2 of







4. Managing Underperformance Risk in Project Portfolio Selection 111
Under a uniform matroid, i.e., Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n
∣∣ ∑
k∈N yk = m}, we


















Equation (4.8) defines a specific target to achieve. Equation (4.9) defines a
special type of uncertain return, where the return of each project is deter-
mined by a common uncertain factor z˜. We assume that z˜ is +1 or −1, with
equal probability. Equation (4.10) implies that the only feasible solutions


























We prove that there exists a selection for this instance such that the
objective value is infinite, if and only if there exists a solution to Equal
Cardinality Partition.







ck = τ and |N1| = |N2| = n/2. Then we set
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Therefore, the objective value of this instance is infinite.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a project selection y∗ such that the objective value
is infinite, i.e., Cα(π˜(y
∗)) ≥ τ , for α > 0. Since, the function exp(−αx) is



































































which implies that Cα(π˜(y







k∈N ck(1 − y
∗
k) = τ . Hence, there exists a solution N1 =
{k
∣∣ y∗k = 1, k ∈ N} and N2 = N \ N1 to Equal Cardinality Partition.
4.2.3 Independent returns and interactions
Proposition 8. If there are interactions among the projects, then the recog-
nition version of problem (4.7) with independent deterministic returns under
a uniform matroid is unary NP -complete.
Proof. By reduction from the following unaryNP-Complete problem (Gary and Johnson
1979).
Maximum Clique: Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), with vertex set
V , edge set E, and an integer m, does there exist a clique in G of total size
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at least m?
Under a uniform matroid, i.e., Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n
∣∣ ∑
k∈N yk = m}, we
construct an instance of problem (4.7) where each project i corresponds to a
vertex i ∈ G, and has deterministic return 1. For any pair of selected projects
(i, j) ∈ N , no interaction effect occurs if (i, j) ∈ E, and an interaction effect
of -1 occurs if (i, j) 6∈ E. We show that this instance has a total return of at
least m, if and only if the maximum clique problem has a solution.
(⇒) Suppose there exists a maximum clique G′ ⊂ G, where |G′| ≥ m. Then,
in the project selection problem, we select the projects that correspond to
exactly m vertices of G′. By construction, the matroid constraint is satisfied,
hence this selection is feasible. Moreover, the total deterministic return of
the selected projects is m.
(⇐) Suppose there exists a feasible selection S ⊂ N of projects with total
return at least m. From feasibility, |S| = m. Since each project has de-
terministic return 1, and there are no positive interaction effects, the total
return must be exactly m. Hence, the interaction effect among the selected
projects must be 0. This implies that the set S corresponds to a solution to
the maximum clique problem.
4.3 Algorithm
We now consider the subproblem (4.7) defined by a fixed value of α > 0. The
first result linearizes the indicator function, Γ(β,y).




′vk, k = 0, . . . , K,
where x is determined from y by,
xβ ≤ yi, β ∈ E , i ∈ β
xβ + |β| ≥
∑
i∈β
yi + 1, β ∈ E
x ∈ {0, 1}|E|;







vkβ′ , k = 0, . . . , K.
Proof. Given y, we note that for all β ∈ E , xβ = 1 if and only if yi = 1, for
all i ∈ β. Let G = {β
∣∣ Γ(β,y) = 1}, hence ∑β∈E rkβΓ(β,y) =∑β∈G rkβ.




1, if there exists β ′ ∈ G such that β ⊆ β ′;
0, otherwise.
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where x is determined from y according to Lemma 6.







s.t. x ∈ X ,
(4.11)






xβ ≤ yi, β ∈ E , i ∈ β
xβ + |β| ≥
∑
i∈β yi + 1, β ∈ E
y ∈ Y




Next, we transform Cα(x
′vkz˜k) into a piecewise linear function.










, k = 0, . . . , K,
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Q is a probability distribution with Q ∈ arg supP∈F EP (exp(−αuz˜k)), and
U(v) = {x′v
∣∣ x ∈ X}.
















































EQ (z˜k exp (−αuz˜k))
EQ (exp (−αuz˜k))
(x′vk − u).
The first inequality follows from a property of the supremum. The second
inequality follows from the convexity of the entropic function lnEP (exp(·)).
Therefore, for any u ∈ U(vk), we have
Cα(x
′vkz˜k) ≤ Cα(uz˜k) +D
k
α(u)(x
′vk − u). (4.12)
Moreover, equality is achieved in (4.12) when u = x′vk.
Observe that the transformation of Cα(x
′vkz˜k) into a piecewise linear
function in Proposition 9 uses all the points u ∈ U(vk), and hence is ex-
act. We evaluate Cα(uz˜k) and D
k
α(u) in the statement of Proposition 9 by

























, for all α > 0. We first calculate φj(α)
under the family of distributions Fj in (4.4), and then compute supp∈P
∑J
j=1 pjφj(α).
We use an asymmetric measure of the difference between two probability dis-
tributions (Kullback and Leibler 1951). Given a reference distribution q and















For example, if the uncertainty level is θ = 0, we have p = q. Also, if
θ ≥ max
j
(− ln qj), p can be any distribution that satisfies the axioms of
probability.
Proposition 10. Given the family of distributions (4.4) and the probability














) exp(−αζj) + (ζj − µj) exp(−αζj)
ζj − ζj
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, with probability (ζj − µj)p
∗
j/(ζj − ζj), j = 1, . . . , J
ζj, with probability (µj − ζj)p
∗




i=1 qi exp (φi(α)/λ
∗)
, j = 1, . . . , J,











by using our binary search algorithm.
Proof. First, we calculate φj(α). The information set of each possible
scenario ζ˜j has the same structure. Hence, we omit the subscript j, and








s.t. Ef (1) = 1
Ef (ζ) ≤ µ
Ef (ζ) ≥ µ
f(ζ) ≥ 0, ζ ∈ [ζ, ζ].
We consider f to consist of infinite dimensional decision variables indexed by
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[ζ, ζ]. By linear programming duality, we have
φ(α) = min y0 + µy1 − µy2
s.t. y0 + ζy1 − ζy2 ≥ exp(−αζ), ∀ζ ∈ [ζ, ζ]
y1, y2 ≥ 0,
(4.14)
where the first constraint is equivalent to
y0 ≥ sup
ζ∈[ζ,ζ]
{exp(−αζ)− (y1 − y2)ζ}
= max
{
exp(−αζ)− (y1 − y2)ζ , exp(−αζ)− (y1 − y2)ζ
}
.
The equality follows from the convexity of (exp(−αζ)− (y1 − y2)ζ), which
implies that its maximum value is achieved at an extreme point. Therefore,









Since the optimal values of y1 and y2 equate the two terms in (4.15), we have
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ζ, with probability (ζ − µ)/(ζ − ζ),
ζ, with probability (µ− ζ)/(ζ − ζ).
We now calculate sup
p∈Pθ
∑J
j=1 pjφj(α). For the real distribution p ∈ Pθ, as
defined by (4.13), the calculation of p∗j , j = 1, . . . , J , in the theorem statement
follows from Nilim and El Ghaoui (September/October 2005).
Proposition 10 strengthens the inequality of Edmundson (1957) and
Madansky (1959), since we only know the range of the mean, not its ex-
act value.
From Proposition 10, we can calculate Cα(uz˜k) and D
k
α(u), for u ∈






s.t. tk ≤ Cα(uz˜k) +Dkα(u)(x
′vk − u), k = 0, . . . , K, ∀ u ∈ U(vk)
x ∈ X .
(4.16)
The size of U(vk) is large, and as discussed in Section 4.2, the existence of
an efficient algorithm for searching it is unlikely. This justifies the following
enumerative procedure.
Algorithm BD
1. For each k = 0, . . . , K, choose a subset Uk = {x′vk}, for some x ∈ X .
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s.t. tk ≤ Cα(uz˜k) +Dkα(u)(x
′vk − u), k = 0, . . . , K, ∀ u ∈ Uk
x ∈ X ,
(4.17)
and denote the solution by x∗, and t∗k, k = 0, . . . , K.
3. If t∗k = Cα(x
∗′vk), k = 0, . . . , K, then output the optimal value and
optimal solution x∗, and stop.
4. For values of k such that t∗k > Cα(x
∗′vk), add (x∗′vk) into Uk, and go
to Step 2.
Proposition 11. Algorithm BD finds an optimal solution to problem (4.16)
in a finite number of steps.
Proof. When Algorithm BD terminates, it follows from Proposition 9 that
t∗k = Cα(x
∗′vk) ≤ Cα(uz˜k) +D
k
α(u)(x
∗′vk − u), ∀ u ∈ U(vk).
Hence, x∗, t∗k, k = 0, . . . , K is feasible in problem (4.16). Since problem
(4.17) is a relaxation of problem (4.16), x∗, t∗k, k = 0, . . . , K is also optimal
in problem (4.16).
Note that U(vk) is a finite set for each k. Moreover, at each iteration,
there exists at least one index k such that Uk increases.
Remark 3. The need for Algorithm BD arises from the use of binary selection
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variables and the nonlinear objective function, not from our model choices
of project bundles and the linear factor-based model.
4.4 Heuristic URI
In many situations, project selection is mainly constrained by a budget. For
problems with this characteristic, we now describe a simple heuristic for the
subproblem (4.7), that can be incorporated in the overall algorithm described
in Section 4.3. This heuristic can easily be implemented on a spreadsheet to
assist managerial decision making.




∣∣∣ c′y ≤ b
y ∈ {0, 1}n

 .
Let ei represent an n dimensional vector, where the ith element is one,
and the others are zero. We describe a simple heuristic for problem (4.7).
Heuristic URI
Input: ARA parameter α.
Output: Heuristic solution yGα , and its certainty equivalent C
G
α .
1. Start with an empty selection, y = 0;
Set c = 0, to represent the total cost of the currently selected projects.
2. Let I = {i
∣∣ i ∈ N , yi = 0, c+ ci ≤ b}. If I = ∅, then go to Step 5.




Cα (π˜ (y + ei))− Cα (π˜(y))
ci
, i ∈ I
}
.
4. If Cα (π˜(y + ej)) > Cα (π˜(y)), then select the jth project, set y =
y + ej and c = c+ cj , and go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 5.
5. Output yGα = y and C
G
α = Cα (π˜(y)), and stop.








= Cα (π˜(y + ei))− Cα (π˜(y)) ,
Heuristic URI is the standard greedy rule for the deterministic knapsack
problem (Kellerer et al. 2004).
We use a simple example, which considers both interactions and correla-
tion, to illustrate the steps of Heuristic URI. Six projects are available with
equal cost, to develop three products A, B and C. The project data appears
in Table 4.1. Because of the limited budget, no more than three projects can
be selected. For each product, there are two available projects, but selecting
both of them results in diseconomies of scale. Thus, the total return is 20%
less than the sum of the two individual returns. Furthermore, the uncertain
return of each project depends affinely on two random factors. The first fac-
tor, for example technical issues in the project, influences only the project
itself. The second factor, for example the state of the economy, potentially in-
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fluences all projects. We define the decision variables y ∈ {0, 1}6, and project
bundle set E = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {3, 4}, {5}, {6}, {5, 6}}. Table 4.1
shows the returns for each project bundle.
Product Project Bundle Return
A
1 r˜{1} = z˜1 + z˜7
2 r˜{2} = z˜2 + z˜7
{1,2} r˜{1,2} = 0.8(r˜{1} + r˜{2})
B
3 r˜{3} = z˜3 + z˜7
4 r˜{4} = z˜4 + z˜7
{3,4} r˜{3,4} = 0.8(r˜{3} + r˜{4})
C
5 r˜{5} = z˜5 + z˜7
6 r˜{6} = z˜6 + z˜7
{5,6} r˜{5,6} = 0.8(r˜{5} + r˜{6})
Tab. 4.1: Project Bundle Data in Heuristic URI Example.
Each uncertain factor is independent of the others, and the value of
z˜i, i = 1, . . . , 7, is either zi or zi, as shown in Table 4.2, with equal probability.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
zi 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 0
zi 20 40 60 80 120 140 10
Tab. 4.2: Factor Returns in Heuristic URI Example.
We set α = 0.0073 as a trial value. Table 4.3 shows the calculations of
Heuristic URI for the example.
For any given α > 0, we use Heuristic URI to solve the subproblem, and
then apply binary search to find the optimal value of α in (4.6). Thus, if
τ ≤ CGα = Cα(π˜(y)) = 59.59, the trial value of α is increased; otherwise, it
is decreased.
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Iteration Heuristic Steps Calculations j
1
Initialization y = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), c = 0, Cα(p˜i(y))=0
5
Feasible Projects I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
i 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cα (p˜i(y + ei)) 14.54 17.61 19.07 19.01 22.49 18.95
2
Update y = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), c = 1, Cα(p˜i(y)) = 22.49
3
Feasible Projects I = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}
i 1 2 3 4 6
Cα (p˜i(y + ei)) 36.85 39.92 41.38 41.32 40.81
3
Update y = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), c = 2, Cα(p˜i(y)) = 41.38
6
Feasible Projects I = {1, 2, 4, 6}
i 1 2 4 6
Cα (p˜i(y + ei)) 55.55 58.62 55.17 59.59
4
Update y = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1), c = 3, Cα(p˜i(y)) = 59.59
Feasible Projects I = ∅, stop.
Output yGα = y = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1), C
G
α = Cα(p˜i(y)) = 59.59
Tab. 4.3: Example Calculations using Heuristic URI.
4.5 Computational Studies
In Section 4.5.1, we describe several benchmark approaches that can be used
for project selection, and how to solve them. Section 4.5.2 contains a compar-
ative study of the URI and Heuristic URI against the benchmark approaches.
Section 4.5.3 provides a sensitivity analysis of the performance of the URI.
Finally, Section 4.5.4 studies the robustness of the URI.
4.5.1 Benchmark selection approaches
In this set of experiments, we assume for both the URI approaches and the
benchmarks that the probability distributions of the factors are known. In
Section 4.5.4, we show that this assumption does not significantly affect URI
performance. We now describe several benchmark selection approaches for
comparison with the URI.
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Expected return
We consider maximizing expected return as the objective. Based on the for-















x′vkE (z˜k) . (4.18)
Problem (4.18) is a deterministic knapsack problem, which is computation-
ally easy to solve for large problems.
Underperformance probability
We consider the objective of minimizing the probability that the return will










However, optimization of this model is a highly intractable problem. We
solve it using simulation. We generate a sample consisting ofM independent
random factor scenarios. Each scenario i contains a realization of indepen-
dently generated random factors zi1, . . . , z
i
K . Given v
0, . . . , vK , the problem
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, i = 1, . . . ,M
Ii ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . ,M
x ∈ X ,
(4.19)







If the sample size M is large enough, then the solution from (4.19) closely
approximates the solution that minimizes the underperformance probability.
Markowitz model
We use the Markowitz (1959) model, which yields returns with minimum
variance, subject to the expected return being greater than a target. The














x ∈ X ,
(4.20)
where Var(·) is the variance of a random variable.
Let V denote a |E| × K matrix of correlation factors, where the kth
column is vk. Let Σ denote the covariance matrix of the random factors
z˜0, . . . , z˜K . By assumption z˜k is independent of z˜i, i 6= k, henceΣ is a diagonal
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matrix with its kth diagonal element Σk,k = Var(z˜k). Therefore, problem
(4.20) is equivalent to




x′vkE (z˜k) ≥ τ
x ∈ X .
(4.21)
Problem (4.21) is a quadratic optimization problem with binary decision
variables, which we solve using CPLEX.
Maximization of Roy’s safety-first ratio
We consider maximization of Roy’s safety-first ratio as the project selection
















where σ(·) is the standard deviation of a random variable. For Roy’s safety-
first ratio optimization problem to be well posed, we assume that the op-
timum Roy’s safety-first ratio is positive and finite. In this case, problem
(4.22) can be equivalently reformulated as the following quadratic optimiza-

















x ∈ X ,
which we solve using CPLEX.
4.5.2 Comparison with benchmarks
Using the guidelines of Hall and Posner (2001), (a) we generate a wide range
of parameter specifications, (b) the data generated is representative of real
world scenarios, and (c) the experimental design varies only the parameter-
s that may affect the analysis. A project instance is specified by a set of
projects, deterministic constraints, correlations, random factors, and inter-
actions. We randomly generate 200 project instances with n = 50, and a
budget constraint which implies that no more than 25 projects can be select-
ed.
We generate interactions by randomly assigning an index from UI(1, . . . , 100)
to each project. We specify that interaction effects r˜β = η|β|
∑
i∈β r˜i exist a-
mong projects with the same index. We let η1 = 1, η2 = 1.1, η3 = 1.25, and
η|β| = 1.5 when |β| ≥ 4. We consider 50 independent random factors, which
follow two-point distributions with mean µi and standard deviation σi, given
by µi = 80+(i−1)×2.5 and σi = 10+(i−1)×7.5, i = 1, . . . , 50. To consider
skewness, the probability of a high return for random factor i is independent-
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ly generated as pHi ∼ U(0.55, 0.95). Given µi, σi, and p
H
i , the random factors





let rii = 1, which specifies that project i mainly depends on its local factor i,
and generate rki as U(−0.5, 0.5), for k 6= i, which implies the correlation. We
let ϕ denote the ratio of the target to the maximum expected return, which
completes the specification of the project instance, where ϕ ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8}.
For each project instance, we (a) find solutions using each selection
approach, (b) randomly generate a sample of size 50,000 for the 50 random
factors, and (c) compute the returns for each selection approach and each
sample instance.
To provide a fair comparison between our two models and the four
benchmark approaches, we first apply the four criteria that the benchmark
approaches directly optimize. These criteria are expected return, underper-
formance probability, standard deviation, and Roy’s safety-first ratio, re-
spectively. We also consider four widely used performance criteria that are
optimized neither by the benchmark approaches nor by the models we pro-
pose. The first is expected loss relative to the target. Second, normalizing
by the probability of a loss, we consider conditional expected loss. Both
these criteria are widely used in financial risk management (Embrechts et al.
1997). Finally, we consider the value at risk (VaR), i.e. the threshold loss
that the project portfolio does not exceed with a specified probability, at
both the 95% and 99% levels (Jorion 2006). A negative value at risk rep-
resents the minimum profit that is attainable with the specified probability.
Table 4.4 shows the mean performance of each project selection approach,
for all eight criteria. Because of the slow convergence of problem (4.19), the
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program for underperformance probability is terminated after 10 minutes for









return deviation ratio @ 95% @ 99%
0.6
URI 12018 18.67% 3830 0.8969 450 2351 -5400 -2380
Heuristic URI 11961 19.01% 3835 0.8818 463 2373 -5326 -2294
Expected return 14367 17.50% 6275 0.9438 716 3906 -3428 1623
UP 13271 16.70% 4849 0.9785 521 3003 -4798 -846
Markowitz model 8647 47.40% 2392 0.0123 943 1990 -4500 -2583
Roy’s SF ratio 13737 15.40% 5040 1.0371 489 3055 -4948 -868
0.7
URI 13126 24.21% 4546 0.6836 738 3002 -5249 -1647
Heuristic URI 13117 24.36% 4548 0.6787 743 3008 -5236 -1628
Expected return 14367 23.39% 6275 0.7079 1007 4183 -3428 1623
UP 13646 23.60% 5239 0.6974 849 3527 -4470 -169
Markowitz model 10082 47.43% 2968 0.0091 1174 2476 -4923 -2536
Roy’s SF ratio 14061 22.09% 5454 0.7537 817 3593 -4539 -117
0.8
URI 13884 30.84% 5243 0.4643 1166 3743 -4764 -570
Heuristic URI 13865 31.00% 5259 0.4593 1179 3764 -4712 -497
Expected return 14367 30.49% 6275 0.4719 1393 4494 -3428 1623
UP 13682 32.73% 5467 0.4031 1335 4022 -4115 360
Markowitz model 11521 47.41% 3683 0.0080 1459 3077 -5113 -2133
Roy’s SF ratio 14242 29.89% 5768 0.4895 1248 4113 -4173 492
UP=Underperformance probability; SF=safety-first; EL=Expected Loss;
CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
Tab. 4.4: Performance of Various Project Selection Approaches.
Table 4.4 shows that the average performance of the URI and Heuristic
URI is almost identical across all criteria. Hence, almost the full benefit of
our models can be achieved by a simple spreadsheet based solution approach.
We compare the URI against the four benchmark approaches using the
mean performance for the three target levels. Comparing with the risk neu-
tral maximization of expected return approach shows that the URI is risk
averse, as evidenced by a 27.6% smaller standard deviation, a 24.4% smaller
expected loss, and a 49.9% smaller VaR @ 95%. Comparing with minimiza-
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tion of underperformance probability shows that the URI is 12.3% smaller
in standard deviation, 16.0% smaller in expected loss, and 15.5% smaller in
VaR @ 95%. Comparing with the highly risk averse Markowitz model shows
that the URI has a 48.2% smaller underperformance probability, a 70 times
greater Roy’s safety-first ratio, and a 34.2% smaller expected loss. Compar-
ing with Roy’s safety-first ratio maximization shows that the URI is 16.2%
smaller in standard deviation, 15.5% smaller in conditional expected loss,
and 8 times smaller in VaR @ 99%. In general, the URI provides solutions
with high Roy’s SF ratio, low expected loss and conditional expected loss,
and low Value at Risk. Therefore, with respect to achieving targets, the URI
outperforms the benchmark approaches.
The only comparisons where our models fall substantially short are in
expected return against the risk neutral maximization of expected return
approach, and in minimization of standard deviation against the highly risk
averse Markowitz model. This occurs because the URI and Heuristic URI
are mildly risk averse. The URI and Heuristic URI provide much better
expected loss and VaR performance than maximization of expected return,
and much better expected return and underperformance probability than the
Markowitz model.
4.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
It is of interest to potential users of our selection models to know when their
relative advantage in performance over the benchmark approaches is greatest.
The relative advantage of the URI is sensitive to the target level. Compared
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to other selection approaches, both the disadvantage and advantage of the
URI decrease with the target level. The reason is that as the target level
increases, the project selections from the URI, underperformance probability
minimization, Markowitz model, and Roy’s safety-first ratio maximization
approaches become less risk averse. Consequently, their project selections
become more similar to those from the risk neutral maximization of expect-
ed return approach. Hence, the differences among the solutions from these
models decrease.
The relative advantage of our models is also sensitive to the amount of
interaction. We group the 200 project instances by the number of project
bundles: low interaction (at most 62 bundles), medium interaction (from 63
through 66), and high interaction (at least 67). For each selection approach,
Figure 4.1 shows the mean performance for each of the three groups, normal-
ized by that of the URI. For the VaR, we evaluate the performance using the
maximum expected return as a reference point. The advantage of the URI
compared to Roy’s safety-first ratio maximization approach, when measured
by standard deviation, expected loss, conditional expected loss and VaR, in-
creases with the density of interaction. Similar results apply to comparisons
with the underperformance probability minimization approach. Therefore,
our recommendation to use the URI over the other two approaches is stronger
in project selection environments with more interactions.
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Fig. 4.1: Performance Profiles at Various Interaction Densities.
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4.5.4 Robustness
We study the robustness of our URI model, using two computational tests.
In the first test, we compare two URI solutions; the first uses full infor-
mation about the distribution, whereas the second uses only knowledge of
the bounded support and mean. We consider the same 200 instances as
in Section 4.5.2, except for the uncertain factors. Under full information,
the 50 uncertain factors follow the beta distribution with parameters αi, βi,
i = 1, . . . , 50, which are generated as U(0.1, 0.9); under distributional ambi-
guity, we calculate the corresponding bound support [0, 1] and mean support
αi
αi+βi
for each uncertain factor. We set ϕ = 0.7. For each project instance,
we (a) find URI solutions from the two information sets, (b) randomly gen-
erate a sample of size 100,000 for the 50 random factors following the beta
distribution described above, and (c) compute the returns for both solutions
from each information set.
Among the 200 project instances, there are 119 instances where the
distributional ambiguity solution is the same as the full information solution.








information return deviation @95% @99%
Full 49.07 4.422% 7.024 0.1431 2.854 -37.42 -32.60
Robust 48.88 4.339% 7.022 0.1477 2.887 -37.23 -32.38
UP=Underperformance probability; EL=Expected Loss;
CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
Tab. 4.5: Robustness of URI Performance.
The difference in performance between the two solutions is less than
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1.5%, except for expected loss where it is 3.6%. We therefore conclude that
the performance of our models is highly robust against distributional ambi-
guity.
We also conduct a second computational test of the robustness of our
model, using real data. The data used is the daily returns of the 49 industry
portfolios provided by Fama & French 1. Our problem is to choose 10 of the
49 industries to achieve a target of 70% of the maximal expected return.
For simplicity, we assume that the returns from these industry portfolios
are independent from each other. We use the daily return for dates before
January 2011 as historical data, from which we consider two approaches
based on different distributional information: 1) Empirical distribution, and
2) Robust approach with support and mean inferred from empirical data.
After calculating the optimal portfolio selection for each approach, we then
use the daily return data in 2011 to test the performance of the two portfolios.








data information return deviation @95% @99%
2006-2010
Empirical 0.1112 46.03% 17.84 6.632 14.41 29.81 64.20
Robust 0.2243 48.02% 19.19 7.103 14.79 31.56 65.66
2007-2010
Empirical 0.0317 46.43% 17.26 6.611 14.24 27.82 65.10
Robust 0.0877 47.62% 17.60 6.665 14.00 28.52 65.29
2008-2010
Empirical 0.1783 46.83% 17.11 6.404 13.68 27.58 64.86
Robust 0.2962 46.43% 17.88 6.618 14.25 28.15 63.48
UP=Underperformance probability; EL=Expected Loss;
CEL=Conditional Expected Loss; VaR=Value at Risk.
Tab. 4.6: Robustness for Fama & French 49 Industry Portfolios.
Although both approaches have comparable level of risk, the robust ap-
1 Source: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html
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proach typically achieves significantly higher expected return, in some cases
twice as high, compared to the empirical approach. Using the solutions cal-
culated from the 2008 – 2010 data, Figure 4.2 shows the values of the two
portfolios as they evolve over time, assuming that they are both initially
valued at $1. The results indicate that the robust approach outperforms the
empirical distribution approach.















Fig. 4.2: Values of Project Portfolios Evolving Over Time.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter considers the problem of selecting projects when the return of
each project is uncertain. The problem studied is general enough to allow
interactions between the different projects, and correlations between their
uncertain returns. We describe an underperformance riskiness index for this
problem. Our model minimizes the underperformance riskiness index, which
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is the reciprocal of the ARA parameter, while keeping the certainty equiva-
lent of the uncertain returns above a given target. The model is solved using
binary search on the ARA value of the project portfolio, with solution of the
subproblems by a Benders decomposition method. We demonstrate compu-
tationally that the URI model identifies better project portfolios with respect
to achieving the target than those found by classical approaches, including
maximization of expected return, mean-variance analysis, minimization of
underperformance probability, and Roy’s safety-first ratio maximization. For
project selection problems that are constrained only by a budget, we describe
a simple but highly accurate heuristic URI procedure. The URI procedure
also provides robust performance in comparisons with known data and with
a sampling approach using real data.
The data requirements of our models are not excessive or unusual. We
do not assume knowledge of a specific probability distribution for the factors
that affect project return; instead, we assume only bounded support and
mean for the factor values. Covariance information is implied by common
factors between projects, which should be identified as a risk issue during
preliminary project evaluation. Even if covariance information is not fully
available, the robust selection model can still be used, based on partial covari-
ance information. Finally, interaction effects between projects are routinely
identified during project definition.
Our results provide several insights that managers should find useful.
First, it is now possible to design a URI project portfolio that is least risky,
subject to meeting a target certainty equivalent level. Second, this design
can be achieved very accurately using a computationally efficient procedure.
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Third, the resulting project portfolios offer significant benefits over those
obtained by all previously used approaches. Fourth, it is possible to balance
upside potential and downside risk accurately, by adjusting the target level.
Finally, in project selection situations that are constrained only by a budget,
a simple spreadsheet-based procedure routinely provides almost exact URI
project portfolios.
Several opportunities exist for future research. First, in many practi-
cal projects, the initial investment cost is not predictable, and uncertainty
about it can be incorporated into a URI model. Second, a related extension
is allowing the available budget to be random. In practice, available budgets
for funding projects are often uncertain. Third, the URI model should be
applied to dynamic project selection problems. In such problems, projects
with random investment cost and return become available over time. Con-
sequently, some part of the available budget may need to be held in reserve
for future opportunities. Fourth, the problem considered here can be gener-
alized to allow for decisions about the timing of projects, in order to match
resource requirements and resource availability over time. A URI approach
can usefully be applied to this problem. Finally, it would be valuable to per-
form large scale behavioral experiments on project selection, to determine
the factors that influence how well URI explains those decisions in practice.
We hope that our work will encourage future research in these interesting
and important directions.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The impact of targets is both observable and sensible in decision making
process in industry. It is of great interest to incorporate the targets in the
operations management area. In this thesis, we propose a target-based frame-
work for certain operations management problem. The framework does not
increase the computational complexity, which is an important issue in prac-
tice, especially when problems like dynamic programming and zero-one opti-
mization are involved. Moreover, it is shown to have strong descriptive power
and address behavioral preferences observed in laboratory experiments. Last
but not least, compared with the abstract concept of risk attitude, which has
to be calibrated for adopting expected utility approach, target profit is much
easier to observe, and it helps in aligning the whole firm’s objective.
In this thesis, we use four risk measures in different contexts (CSM in
Definition 1, ESM in Definition 2, CPRI in Definition 4, URI in Definition
10). Among these four measures, CPRI is the only one suitable for multi-
period decision problems. With further observation, the CPRI is actually the
summation of the URI over all periods. While CSM, ESM, and URI are all
measures for single-period risky position, we can see that the maximization
of ESM and the minimization of URI are indeed identical. Therefore, ESM
and URI are actually equivalent definition, but with different interpretation
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since they are used in different contexts. CSM and ESM have similar intu-
ition in their definition. The main difference between them is, CSM reflects
the emphasis on downside (or upside) risk since it is based on CVaR, while
ESM captures the attention on full scale risk as it is based on the certainty
equivalent for exponential utility function.
5.1 Future Research
There are several opportunities for future research.
• General target-based criterion: As the first step to take into ac-
count targets in optimization, in this thesis, we construct the target-
based criterion from CVaR and exponential utility function to reduce
the complexity in the solution procedure. However, it does not mean
that these are the only important target-based criteria. Indeed, it is
also of great interest to investigate the impact of target by studying
the more general target-based criterion. One potential approach is to
construct the target-based criterion from a general utility function and
then optimize it.
• Problems with multiple decision makers: In this thesis, only one
decision maker is involved in all the problems we consider. Nevertheless,
in operations management, especially in supply chain management,
many important problems are with multiple decision makers, such as
the contract design between wholesalers and retailers. If some/all of
these decision makers are target oriented when facing uncertainties, it
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is still unclear how would the coordination be achieved.
• Verification with real data: While we are proposing the target-
based framework as an alternative to the classical normative model,
such as expected utility theory, for operations management, it is de-
sirable to analyze which framework works better than others in what
context. Since uncertainties exist, how to come up with a fair com-
parison between solutions from different framework is a challenging
problem. One potential solution may be to use real data from industry
to run the back testing.
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